Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
Vuln Intel is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
tool-list score
12
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Free hosted CVE intel for bug-bounty agents: CVE fact-check, attack approaches from paid H1 reports
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http vuln-intel-mcp https://mcp.rozetyp.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# enrich_cve, check_technology, hunt_plan and 9 more
It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer token. Get a free key at https://vulntel.com/signup, then send: Bearer <your-key>. The handshake and tool list work without a key; calling a tool…): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.
Vuln Intel costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
ROAll 3 servers
rozetyp3 servers
3 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer token. Get a free key at https://vulntel.com/signup, then send: Bearer <your-key>. The handshake and tool list work without a key; calling a tool…) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http vuln-intel-mcp https://mcp.rozetyp.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Bearer token. Get a free key at https://vulntel.com/signup, then send: Bearer <your-key>. The handshake and tool list work without a key; calling a tool needs one.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
12 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Full intelligence for a single CVE: CVSS, KEV status, EPSS, CISA SSVC (exploitation/automatable/technical_impact), P1-P4 priority with rationale, affected products/versions, and (live) public-exploit signal. Args: cve_id: e.g. "CVE-2025-12345". include_poc: also query GitHub for public PoC/exploit repos (live).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | string | yes | — |
| include_poc | boolean | no | — |
Find vulnerabilities affecting a product across NVD (CPE) and OSV (package ecosystems), de-duplicated and ranked by priority/EPSS/CVSS. Distinct products that share a name are kept distinct. If one name maps to several VENDORS' unrelated products (e.g. "Sentry" → sentry, mobileiron, apache; "Envoy" → envoyproxy, enphase), the result is flagged ambiguous with `distinct_vendor
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| product | string | yes | — |
| version | no | — | |
| ecosystem | no | — | |
| vendor | no | — | |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Turn a recon'd stack into a ranked dig-order for authorized bug-hunting. For each discovered component, returns its top high-risk CVEs (KEV / CISA-SSVC- active / high-EPSS first) AND its recurring_loci — the bug classes (CWE) this product family repeatedly fails at, ranked by real in-the-wild exploitation — i.e. WHERE to look first and WHAT shape to expect. Components are ordere
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| technologies | array | yes | — |
| per_tech | integer | no | — |
Scan a host's exposed stack and join it to the CVE corpus — the recon workhorse. Fingerprints the homepage + JS bundles (recovering the backend identity and API endpoints homepage detection misses on SPAs), then ranks against live KEV / SSVC-active / high-EPSS into a dig-order. Fetches only public pages — authorized targets only. NON-BLOCKING: a scan takes ~1-4 min, so observe() n
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| host | string | yes | — |
| fresh | boolean | no | — |
| per_tech | integer | no | — |
Search the CVE corpus — one entry point, three retrieval modes picked from your arguments: - query= a concept / technique / weakness (e.g. "SSO SAML assertion replay", "deserialization gadget chain", "server-side request forgery cloud metadata"). By default it FUSES full-text keyword search AND semantic mechanism-search, so you don't have to
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | no | — | |
| cve_id | no | — | |
| cwe | no | — | |
| days | no | — | |
| product | no | — | |
| order | no | — | |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Find how bugs *like this* were actually FOUND — retrieve real disclosed bug-bounty report mechanic-cards whose approach is closest (by mechanism) to your query or a seed CVE. The "what approach worked on a bug like this, on which program, and what did it pay" layer: grounded in real publicly-disclosed, paid HackerOne reports, each distilled to a transferable mechanic (bug_class /
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | no | — | |
| cve_id | no | — | |
| bug_class | no | — | |
| days | no | — | |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| tried | no | — | |
| capec | no | — |
When you're STUCK mid-hunt: describe your POSITION — the attacker state/capabilities you hold, stripped of product names — and get the CONTINUATIONS that worked from positions like it, matched against the full disclosed-report BODIES (the concrete step/payload/precondition), not just the distilled card. This is the "I have a messy pile of capabilities, what are my legal moves?" layer.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| position | string | yes | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| program | no | — |
Submission & escalation co-pilot for a bug-bounty finding. Paste your DRAFT finding (and what you already tried / couldn't achieve) and get a grounded brief built from the closest REAL disclosed reports: (1) precedent & validity — is this an accepted class, with citable reports (ammunition if it was disputed/closed); (2) what's novel/stronger about yours — what to lead with; (3) an esc
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| finding | string | yes | — |
| query | no | — | |
| limit | integer | no | — |
At the START of an engagement on a bug-bounty PROGRAM, get a grounded prior over what bug classes have historically LANDED there — to decide what to look at first and what to skip. Built from real HackerOne disclosed reports: the class distribution for this program, each with LIFT over the global base-rate, sample size, and cited example reports; plus lands_rarely — the classes
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| program | string | yes | — |
Fact-check a claim about a CVE against the corpus — catch hallucinations before they ship. Verifies: does the CVE exist; does it affect the claimed product at the claimed version; is the severity right; is it actually KEV-exploited. Returns per-assertion verdicts (supported / refuted / unverifiable) with cited evidence. Use it to check what another agent (or a draft report) as
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | string | yes | — |
| product | no | — | |
| version | no | — | |
| severity | no | — | |
| exploited | no | — | |
| claim | no | — |
Corpus size and data freshness (CVE / KEV / EPSS counts and latest timestamps).
No parameter schema on file.
Search public repositories for an exact code string; return WHERE it appears. Use it to hunt vendored / copy-pasted copies of known-vulnerable code: search a distinctive line or symbol from the vulnerable function, then FETCH AND READ the hits to judge which copies are still unpatched, reachable, or just fossils/forks. Returns RAW search results only -- it makes no vulnerability j
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | — |
| lang | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Vuln Intel or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100
Release 1.0.2 · scanned 23 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestcc070cd284d279cce46bcc45607c0751bd4cec18191d280708159bb3e9519acb
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| enrich_cve | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| check_technology | no tags | |
| hunt_plan | no tags | |
| observe | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| search_vulns | no tags | |
| find_attack_approaches | no tags | |
| find_continuations | no tags | |
| assist_submission | no tags | |
| program_outcome_prior | no tags | |
| verify_cve_claim | no tags | |
| corpus_stats | no tags | |
| search_public_code | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestcc070cd284d279cc
Scanned2026-10-23
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.0.2.
1.0.2
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Vuln Intel can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.