Check a Base counterparty before you pay it: EAS attestations and on-chain risk reports.
Ripio (community, read-only) is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Unofficial, read-only MCP server for your Ripio account: balances, activity, prices and limits.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'RIPIO_API_KEY=${RIPIO_API_KEY}' --env 'RIPIO_API_SECRET=${RIPIO_API_SECRET}' --transport stdio ripio-community-read-only-mcp '--' npx -y ripio-community-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# ripio_estimate_trade, ripio_get_limits, ripio_get_portfolio and 4 more
It needs RIPIO_API_KEY, RIPIO_API_SECRET: this reads them from your environment, so export them first.
Ripio (community, read-only) costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Ripio (community, read-only) as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads RIPIO_API_KEY (Your Ripio API key. Create a read-only key in Ripio > Profile > API), RIPIO_API_SECRET (The secret shown once when you create the key) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export them in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx RIPIO_API_KEY …, setx RIPIO_API_SECRET … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'RIPIO_API_KEY=${RIPIO_API_KEY}' --env 'RIPIO_API_SECRET=${RIPIO_API_SECRET}' --transport stdio ripio-community-read-only-mcp '--' npx -y ripio-community-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: RIPIO_API_KEY — Your Ripio API key. Create a read-only key in Ripio > Profile > API.; RIPIO_API_SECRET — The secret shown once when you create the key.. You set them in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Estimates what a market order on Ripio Trade would cost or return right now: unit price for that size, gross
No parameter schema on file.
How much the account can still deposit, withdraw or swap: Ripio limits per rail (bank, pix, crypto, ripio and
No parameter schema on file.
What the user holds on Ripio right now: Wallet (fiat and crypto), memecoins and Ripio Trade balances in one list,
No parameter schema on file.
Current prices for one or more assets: the Ripio app buy/sell rates (with spread) and, when the pair exists,
No parameter schema on file.
Full detail of one Wallet movement by its id (from ripio_list_activity with source
No parameter schema on file.
Deposits, withdrawals and swaps (source
No parameter schema on file.
Open orders on Ripio Trade, optionally for one pair or side, with price and requested, executed and remaining amounts.
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Ripio (community, read-only) or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| ripio_estimate_trade | no tags | |
| ripio_get_deposit_accounts | no tags | |
| ripio_get_deposit_address | no tags | |
| ripio_get_limits | no tags | |
| ripio_get_portfolio | no tags | |
| ripio_get_prices | no tags | |
| ripio_get_transaction | no tags | |
| ripio_list_activity | no tags | |
| ripio_list_open_orders | no tags | |
| ripio_verify_deposit_address | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.2.5. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Ripio (community, read-only) can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.