Name: ZATCA e-invoicing (Saudi Fatoora)
Author: salmankhan957

ZATCA e-invoicing (Saudi Fatoora) MCP

Create, sign, validate and submit Saudi ZATCA Phase 2 e-invoices; decode QR codes; explain errors.

Grade A Local · stdio API key 7 tools v0.1.1 MIT

No reviews yet by salmankhan957npm Runs on your machine, nothing hosted

96/100

trust score

tools declared

local

runs on your machine

—

downloads a day

What it does

Create, sign, validate and submit Saudi ZATCA Phase 2 e-invoices; decode QR codes; explain errors.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user zatca-e-invoicing-saudi-fatoora-mcp '--' npx -y zatca-toolkit-mcp

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   create_invoice, validate_invoice, decode_qr and 4 more

ZATCA e-invoicing (Saudi Fatoora) costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

salmankhan9571 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts ZATCA e-invoicing (Saudi Fatoora) as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.

claude mcp add --scope user zatca-e-invoicing-saudi-fatoora-mcp '--' npx -y zatca-toolkit-mcp

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.

What it asks of you

Nothing is required, but it can take ZATCA_ENV (sandbox (default), simulation or production), ZATCA_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE (Path to the EGS secp256k1 private key (PEM)), ZATCA_CERTIFICATE (CSID certificate or binarySecurityToken from ZATCA), ZATCA_CSID_SECRET (CSID secret, needed to submit invoices), ZATCA_SELLER_FILE (Path to seller details JSON) if you want to set them.

What it writes

One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.

What you approve

7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.

Build a ZATCA Phase 2 UBL invoice, credit note or debit note with exact VAT totals, and sign it (hash, ECDSA signature, XAdES, QR) when signing credentials are configured.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
kind	string	yes	standard = B2B tax invoice (cleared), simplified = B2C (reported)
type	string	no	—
number	string	yes	Your invoice number
issueDate	string	no	YYYY-MM-DD; defaults to today in KSA
issueTime	string	no	HH:mm:ss; defaults to now in KSA
seller	object	no	Omit to use ZATCA_SELLER from the server configuration
buyer	object	no	—
supplyDate	string	no	YYYY-MM-DD; required for standard invoices
paymentMeansCode	string	no	10 cash, 30 credit transfer, 42 bank account, 48 card
billingReference	string	no	Original invoice number (credit/debit notes)
reason	string	no	Reason for a credit/debit note
note	string	no	—
lines	array	yes	—
counter	integer	no	ICV; omit to use the local chain state
previousInvoiceHash	string	no	PIH; omit to use the local chain state
sign	boolean	no	Sign if credentials are configured
outputPath	string	no	Write the XML to this file instead of returning it inline

Check a ZATCA XML invoice offline: common BR-KSA/EN16931 rules, totals arithmetic, and for signed documents the invoice hash, ECDSA signature, XAdES digests and every QR tag. Explains each problem in English and Arabic with a fix.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
xml	string	no	The XML text
path	string	no	Or a path to the XML file

Decode the base64 TLV payload of a ZATCA e-invoice QR code into its fields (seller, VAT number, timestamp, totals, hash, signature, key). Flags non-BER lengths that ZATCA rejects.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
qr	string	yes	Base64 QR payload (the text inside the QR image)

Explain ZATCA rule codes or API error messages (e.g. "BR-KSA-37", "invalid-invoice-hash", or a pasted API response) in plain English and Arabic, with the fix.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
error	string	yes	A code, a message, or a whole API response

Compute the ZATCA invoice hash (base64 SHA-256 of the canonicalized XML without UBLExtensions, Signature and QR). Use it to debug "invalid-invoice-hash" or as the next PIH.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
xml	string	no	—
path	string	no	—

Create a secp256k1 private key (written to a file, never shown) and the CSR needed to onboard an e-invoicing unit (EGS) with ZATCA. Returns the CSR and the exact value to send to POST /compliance.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
commonName	string	yes	Unique name of the EGS unit
solutionName	string	yes	—
modelOrVersion	string	yes	—
deviceSerial	string	yes	—
vatNumber	string	yes	—
organizationUnit	string	yes	Branch name (or 10-digit TIN for VAT group members)
organizationName	string	yes	—
invoiceType	string	yes	1100 both, 1000 standard only, 0100 simplified only
location	string	yes	Branch address / national short address
industry	string	yes	—
environment	string	no	—
keyOutputPath	string	yes	Where to write the private key (keep it secret)

Send a signed invoice to ZATCA's Fatoora API using the configured CSID: "report" (simplified/B2C), "clear" (standard/B2B, returns the stamped invoice) or "compliance" (onboarding checks).

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
mode	string	yes	—
xml	string	no	—
path	string	no	—

Free

$0 forever

Every tool, no call limit
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Source published under MIT
Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install ZATCA e-invoicing (Saudi Fatoora) or to call it, at any volume.

ATrust score 96 / 100

Release 0.1.1 · scanned 15 Nov 2026

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score96

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilitymoderate

Coveragesource

Verificationrepo

Surface digesteed48011effb554b0f429e8ac623f21366b4cf634c500c7eb11d90a1b4162863

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	moderate	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−3
verification-discount	repo	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable	−1
coverage-honesty	source	inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see	−0

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourceread

Package metadataread

Live transportnot available

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
create_invoice	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
validate_invoice	no tags
decode_qr	no tags
explain_error	no tags
compute_invoice_hash	no tags
generate_csr	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
submit_invoice	external-sink	external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digesteed48011effb554b

Scanned2026-11-15

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.