Janus Pay for agents: take payments that settle in BSV, refund them, and pay x402 paywalls.
Nothing to run from here
x402 Gateway — Inspect Paid API Terms is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
90/100
tool-list score
9
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
x402 Gateway MCP: payment contract, gateway status, and Coherent Gate signal checks (interfere).
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http x402-gateway-inspect-paid-api-terms-mcp 'https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/mcp?registry=scriptmasterlabs'
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# sml_discover, sml_status, x402_contract and 6 more
x402 Gateway — Inspect Paid API Terms costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http x402-gateway-inspect-paid-api-terms-mcp 'https://mcp-x402.onrender.com/mcp?registry=scriptmasterlabs'Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
9 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Find the x402 Gateway contract and where to inspect fresh payment requirements. FREE.
Takes no parameters.
Check the public x402 Gateway identity and canonical payment rail. FREE.
Takes no parameters.
Inspect the canonical x402 payment contract. Returns network, USDC asset, payTo, headers, and the rule for resolving fresh target requirements. FREE.
Takes no parameters.
Coherent Gate (PAID, x402/USDC). Scores whether your trading-signal paths agree: confidence-weighted long/short/flat consensus, coherence 0-1, and a pass/block gate (pass needs a non-flat consensus and coherence at or above the threshold, default 0.6). Tiers by path count: scout ≤4 $0.01, standard ≤8 $0.05, beast ≤32 $0.25 (defaults). The $0.25 max tier is charged upfront; on the x402 rail the unu
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| paths | array | no | Coherent Gate: AI trading signal paths to check for coherence. Priced tiers: scout ≤4, standard ≤8, beast ≤32 (defaults); >32 hard-rejected. |
| ticker | string | no | Optional: pull extra paths for this ticker from registered path sources (see docs/COHERENT_GATE_PATH_SOURCES.md). |
| sources | array | no | Optional path-source ids; default = all enabled verified sources. Requires ticker. |
| wallet_address | string | no | Agent wallet address (informational). |
| payment_tx_hash | string | no | Base USDC tx hash (sovereign rail). |
| payment_header | string | no | Base64 X-PAYMENT EIP-3009 payload (standard rail). |
| arc_auth_id | string | no | Arc rail: authId from AuthCaptureEscrow.authorize() for at least the max-tier amount to our receiver. Only the used tier is captured; the rest returns via reclaim() after expiry. |
Coherent Gate + Leviathan (PAID, x402/USDC). Fetches the SML Leviathan signal (squeeze, momentum, or all) for a ticker, adds it as one path with your optional paths and registered sources, then runs the same coherence check as interfere: consensus, coherence 0-1, pass/block gate. Same tiers and billing as interfere ($0.25 max tier charged upfront; x402 difference recorded as owed, Arc rail capture
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ticker | string | yes | Ticker symbol, 1-10 uppercase letters (e.g. AAPL). |
| signal_type | string | yes | Which Leviathan signal to fetch and add as a path: squeeze, momentum, or all. |
| paths | array | no | Coherent Gate: extra signal paths (Leviathan adds one; total ≤ 32). |
| sources | array | no | Optional path-source ids added alongside Leviathan; default = all enabled verified sources. |
| wallet_address | string | no | Agent wallet address (informational). |
| payment_tx_hash | string | no | Base USDC tx hash (sovereign rail). |
| payment_header | string | no | Base64 X-PAYMENT EIP-3009 payload (standard rail). |
| arc_auth_id | string | no | Arc rail: authId from AuthCaptureEscrow.authorize() for at least the max-tier amount to our receiver. Only the used tier is captured; the rest returns via reclaim() after expiry. |
Spend Gate (PAID $0.005 USDC on Base via x402). Advisory payment assessment — no wallet signing or spending by the buyer: a real Provider Trust approval and price cap are mandatory; explicit package/history rejections block. Four distinct decision inputs vote pay-side/reject-side — provider_trust (Provider Trust verify_provider) and payload_safety (ScriptDocs vulnerability check, only when manifes
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| payee | string | yes | Payee domain (e.g. "api.example.com") and/or full endpoint URL the wallet is about to pay. |
| quoted_amount | number | yes | Quoted amount in USDC the wallet is about to pay. |
| tool_category | string | no | Optional category of the tool/service being bought (e.g. data_lookup, market_data, inference, compute). Selects the v1 default cap when policy_cap_usdc is omitted; when omitted entirely the cap table' |
| policy_cap_usdc | number | no | Optional caller policy cap in USDC; overrides the v1 default cap table for price_sanity. |
| manifest_url | string | no | Optional package page URL (npmjs.com/package/…, pypi.org/project/…, crates.io/crates/…) for the payload_safety path. |
| wallet_address | string | no | Agent wallet address (informational). |
| payment_tx_hash | string | no | Base USDC tx hash (sovereign rail) paying $0.005 to the canonical SML receiver. |
| payment_header | string | no | Base64 X-PAYMENT EIP-3009 payload (standard rail) for $0.005 USDC on Base. |
OMNIGATE Runtime catalog search (FREE). Finds SML paid routes a runtime script can call with sml.call(id, {query|path|body}), with live per-call USDC prices, plus published capsules (ready-made scripts). Use this before omnigate_runtime_execute to pick route ids. Prices are the live upstream registry amounts; nothing here spends.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | no | Keywords, e.g. "short squeeze", "sec filings", "web extract". Empty lists everything (capped). |
| limit | integer | no | Max routes to return. |
OMNIGATE Runtime (PAID, USDC). Run ONE JavaScript script that calls many SML tools, in one round trip, instead of one model turn per tool call. The script is the body of an async function: const r = await sml.call("<route-id>", { query: {...} }); return r.data;. Available inside: sml.call, sml.tools.search, sml.tools.get, sml.budget, sml.sleep, sml.log, sml.input. Every call is metered at its li
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| script | string | no | JavaScript async-function body. Use await; return the final result. |
| capsule_id | string | no | Run a published capsule instead of a script (e.g. cap_name@1 or cap_name@latest). |
| budget_usdc | string | no | Hard spending cap for the whole run in USDC (min 0.01, max 25). |
| input | object | no | JSON object exposed to the script as sml.input. |
| mode | string | no | sync waits for the result (120s wall); async returns run_id to poll /runtime/runs/{id}. |
| payment_header | string | no | Base64 x402 v2 payment payload for exactly budget_usdc USDC on Base (from the challenge). |
| credit_token | string | no | Runtime credit token (smlrt_…) returned by an earlier run. |
| arc_auth_id | string | no | Arc AuthCaptureEscrow authorization id (maxAmount ≥ budget, expiry ≤ 24h). |
OMNIGATE Runtime receipt (FREE). Returns a run receipt — script sha256, payer, rail, payment tx, every upstream call with request/response hashes and charges, outcome — signed with Ed25519 and hash-chained to the previous receipt, plus a verification of signature, body hash and chain link. Use it to prove what an agent ran and paid for.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | Receipt id from a runtime run (rcpt_…). |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install x402 Gateway — Inspect Paid API Terms or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 90 / 100
Release 1.6.3 · scanned 6 Nov 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score90
Findings0 threat · 3 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digest78a46040c999a773b065c187a261a0790bcdb99f18fbf7ffeef2a5091461ceb2
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 90
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| sml_discover | no tags | |
| sml_status | no tags | |
| x402_contract | no tags | |
| interfere | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| leviathan_interfere | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| spend_gate_check | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| omnigate_runtime_search | no tags | |
| omnigate_runtime_execute | code-execexternal-sink | code-exec: parameter "script"; external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| omnigate_runtime_receipt | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest78a46040c999a773
Scanned2026-11-06
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.6.3.
1.6.3
5 Nov 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
1.6.2
5 Nov 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.6.1
2 Nov 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.6.0
1 Nov 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.5.0
undated
No release note was published with this version.
1.3.0
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
—
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