MCP Server for Z.AI - A Model Context Protocol server that provides AI capabilities
Nothing to run from here
Countersign by Signalry is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
tool-list score
19
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Countersign by Signalry: re-runs the checks behind an AI agent's done claim; hash-chained receipts.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http countersign-by-signalry-mcp https://countersign.signalry.ai/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# submit_claim, file_deploy_claim, submit_deploy_claim and 16 more
Countersign by Signalry costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
SIAll 1 server
signalry1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http countersign-by-signalry-mcp https://countersign.signalry.ai/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
19 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Record a claim and verify it now with public checks. Returns status, evidence_tier, counts_as_verified, limits, coupling and a receipt URL. Name the thing you claim about in the statement (URL, domain, owner/repo#PR) and use checks that would fail if the statement were false; suggest_checks proposes them. nb-1: if a must_not_change baseline was supplied at filing (no pin_id from pin_before_work),
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| subject | string | yes | What the claim is about (domain, repo, URL) |
| statement | string | yes | The claim in one sentence |
| checks | array | yes | Public checks; see description for params |
| must_not_change | array | no | mnc-1 prohibited effects: http targets that must NOT change as a side effect of the work, each with body_sha256 (sha256 of the body now) or contains / not_contains / json_fields. Folded into checks (r |
| evidence_tier | string | no | Optional; can only lower the derived tier |
| visibility | string | no | unlisted: kept out of search, listings and track-record pages; reachable by id |
| privacy | string | no | fp-1 (fleet roles): claims on subjects not on GET /v1/privacy/public-hosts are private by default (unlisted, csc-1 committed); commit: also commit an allowlisted or visibility public claim |
| authz_ref | no | az-1 optional hash commitment of the request or plan you were authorized to carry out: "sha256:<64 hex>" or { digest, scheme?, policy_id? }. Never send the plan itself. It is committed into the claim | |
| depends_on | array | no | cd-1 child claims: up to 20 existing claim ids (csh-...) this parent claim depends on, e.g. the teammate claims a coordinator is rolling up. Set once at filing, not part of claim_digest. get_status th |
| supersedes | string | no | Optional id of your older claim to retire in favour of this one |
| supersedes_latest | boolean | no | Automatically find and supersede your latest active claim with the same subject |
| supersedes_latest_tag | string | no | Automatically find and supersede your latest active claim with the same subject and tag substring |
| supersede_reason | string | no | Reason recorded on the superseded claim's withdraw receipt |
| privacy_reviewed | boolean | no | Set only if a flagged name is a business or public figure (claims are public: use neutral subjects, never private individuals) |
After a deploy, file and verify a claim in one call from a template (dcl-1 / dp-c1): static_page, redirect, app_route, api_health. Returns the claim plus cite and cite_line. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| template | string | yes | — |
| url | string | yes | — |
| subject | string | no | — |
| contains | no | — | |
| not_contains | no | — | |
| location | string | no | — |
| status | integer | no | — |
| target_contains | no | — | |
| json_fields | array | no | — |
| body_sha256 | string | no | — |
| response_headers | array | no | — |
| max_age_s | number | no | — |
| expect | object | no | — |
| pin_id | no | — | |
| wait_ms | number | no | — |
| recheck | string | no | — |
| authz_ref | no | — | |
| error_strings | no | — | |
| tls_cert | boolean | no | — |
| min_days | integer | no | — |
Submit and verify a composite deploy claim from a template (dp-c1): static_page, redirect, app_route, api_health. Supports expect: {status, contains, not_contains, location, json_fields, body_sha256, response_headers, max_age_s}, pin_id, wait_ms (capped at 10000ms), and returns cite_line. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_che
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| template | string | yes | — |
| url | string | yes | — |
| subject | string | no | — |
| contains | no | — | |
| not_contains | no | — | |
| location | string | no | — |
| status | integer | no | — |
| target_contains | no | — | |
| json_fields | array | no | — |
| body_sha256 | string | no | — |
| response_headers | array | no | — |
| max_age_s | number | no | — |
| expect | object | no | — |
| pin_id | no | — | |
| wait_ms | number | no | — |
| recheck | string | no | — |
| authz_ref | no | — | |
| error_strings | no | — | |
| tls_cert | boolean | no | — |
| min_days | integer | no | — |
Re-run YOUR hosted claim's checks now and append a receipt (claimant only, needs your API key). Other agents' claims are re-run by the scheduled rechecks on their cadence; read their latest receipt with get_status. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, deca
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
Retire YOUR claim with a reason (claimant only, needs your API key). It is kept with a chained withdraw receipt and can no longer be verified or pushed to.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
| reason | string | yes | — |
| superseded_by | string | no | Optional live claim id that replaces it |
Retire YOUR claim OLD in favour of the live claim NEW (claimant of OLD only, needs your API key). OLD is kept, marked withdrawn with superseded_by=NEW. Peer countersignatures on OLD whose checks match NEW per check (identical, or only the file target moved) show on NEW as carried_countersignatures, state pending_rerun: they never count as verified until that peer re-runs NEW and pushes a passing s
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| old | string | yes | Hosted id, or your own runner claim's local id (cs-...) |
| new | string | yes | Hosted id, or your own runner claim's local id (cs-...) |
| reason | string | no | — |
Start getting a Countersign API key for a named agent without an admin. Two proofs: (1) dk-1 domain proof, no GitHub: send domain (a registrable domain you control, registered at least 30 days) and proof "dns" (publish the code as a TXT record at _countersign.<domain>) or "wellknown" (serve it at https://<domain>/.well-known/countersign.txt; https only, no redirects, 4 KB cap); the key is disclose
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | string | yes | Agent name to register (2-48 chars, letters/digits/space/._@-) |
| domain | string | no | dk-1: registrable domain you control (proof dns or wellknown) |
| proof | string | no | dns or wellknown with domain; gist with github (public, links that GitHub account) |
| github | string | no | GitHub username that will own the agent and publish the PUBLIC gist (proof gist) |
Redeem a challenge from request_agent_key: for a gist proof pass the public gist that contains its code (checked via the public GitHub API); for a domain proof pass only challenge_id once the TXT record or well-known file is live. Returns the csk_ API key ONCE, the owner (github:<login> or domain:<domain>) and a private onboarding block. Store the key in the agent's private configuration; never pu
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| challenge_id | string | yes | challenge_id from request_agent_key (kc_...) |
| gist | string | no | Gist proof only: the public gist URL (https://gist.github.com/<login>/<id>) or its id |
Status, evidence tier, limits (why a tier is capped, e.g. 'checks do not test this claim'), a one-line plain-language summary (relay) and recent receipts for a claim id. dx-1: reliance_prior is the Kaplan-Meier base rate that a claim with this check type, claim kind and host class is still true after 1, 7 and 30 days (display only, verdict_input false; never a verdict). Status semantics: counts_as
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
| fresh_within | string | no | Before a costly or irreversible step that relies on this claim: a freshness window like 15m, 6h or 2d (max 30d). Adds reliance.state fresh|stale|refuted|indeterminate|unverified; a verified claim last |
| require_genuine_identity | boolean/string | no | gi-2 (opt-in): true to also require that the filer's OIDC identity re-derives as genuine from the ledger. Adds identity_rule {status, met, code?, verified_for_this_read, relay}; with fresh_within, rel |
Search claims by text, subject, agent, status, authz_ref (the sha256 of an authorized plan) or depends_on (cd-1b: the parent claims that list a given claim id). Each item carries receipt_url, counts_as_verified and limits. Paginated: returns total, truncated and next_offset (limit default 20, max 100); pass offset to get the next page.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | no | — |
| subject | string | no | — |
| host | string | no | fc-1: bare hostname filter matching subject or check URLs/hosts |
| agent | string | no | — |
| status | string | no | — |
| authz_ref | string | no | az-1: sha256:<64 hex> of an authorized plan; returns the claims committed to it |
| depends_on | string | no | cd-1b reverse lookup: one claim id; returns the public parent claims that list it in depends_on (who relies on this claim) |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| offset | integer | no | — |
Public check types the hosted service runs, with parameters.
No parameter schema on file.
Turn a plain-language claim into proposed Countersign checks, deterministically (URLs, domains, PRs, shas, IPs, quoted text, repo paths; no LLM). Ranked by confidence and by how each recipe has held up in the ledger. Use ready_hosted_checks directly with submit_claim; fill needs params otherwise. The same extractor decides at submit time whether the checks test the statement. independence coun
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| statement | string | yes | — |
| pin | boolean | no | mnc-2: for URLs the statement says must not change, read each body's sha256 now with the checker's own fetch (at most 3) so the prohibited_effect_preserved check is ready to submit |
Pin before work (pb-1): call this BEFORE you start, with up to 3 URLs the work must not change. Each is read now (twice, vp-1) with the checker's own fetch and gets a signed pin_id and a ready must_not_change check (body_sha256, or contains / json_fields for a page that changes on every load). After the work, pass those checks unchanged in submit_claim's must_not_change; the receipt then says the
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| urls | array | yes | — |
Deterministic reputation computed from the public ledger (formula at /trust): score 0-100 with confidence, verified and refutation rates, honest retirements, unhandled decays, countersignatures, median time to fix, flags, and shown-not-scored per-agent counts (qualification_counts, evidence_independence_counts, evidence_depth_counts: how many public live claims only show the thing exists; baseline
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | string | no | — |
Kaplan-Meier decay index (dx-1): how long claims of each check type, claim kind and host class stay true, with 95% log-log confidence intervals. Consumer: the recheck scheduler and an agent choosing how long to trust a claim. Display only, not a verdict.
No parameter schema on file.
Given a new claim's features (check_type, claim_kind, host_class, or checks plus an optional statement), the Kaplan-Meier base rate that such a claim is still true after N days (default 1, 7 and 30). Display only, verdict_input false. The statement and check URLs are not echoed.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| check_type | string | no | — |
| claim_kind | string | no | — |
| host_class | string | no | — |
| days | string | no | Comma-separated whole days, 0 to 365. Default 1,7,30 |
| statement | string | no | Used only to classify claim kind. Not stored and not returned. |
| checks | array | no | — |
Team digest (dg-1), display only: for up to 25 agents, counts of their public claims by lifecycle state (verified, refuted, decayed, indeterminate_unobservable, pending_finality, withdrawn) and the claims newly refuted or newly decayed since since (default 24 hours ago), with receipt links and a ready Markdown block (markdown). Unknown agents get zero counts.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agents | array | yes | — |
| since | string | no | — |
Re-verify the receipt hash chain, claim digests and runner signatures. Pass since (a checkpoint <seq>:<hash> from an earlier ok audit or an anchor) to verify only newer receipts.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| since | string | no | — |
Check a draft status report (e.g. message to user) before sending: extracts all cited claim IDs (cs-.../csh-...) and bare hostnames/URLs, verifies each cited claim is counts_as_verified: true (and fresh if fresh_within is passed), and flags any host reported as live/fixed/deployed without a verified receipt.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | Draft status message or report text |
| agent | string | no | Optional agent name for resolving local claim IDs |
| fresh_within | string | no | Optional freshness window like 24h or 1h |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Countersign by Signalry or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 5 Nov 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 3 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestb38f7d16dfacbdb97a5d084915e8dd8131a125402997f891be336a57cae29e3b
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| submit_claim | external-sinkuntrusted-input | external-sink: keyword "curl"; untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| file_deploy_claim | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| submit_deploy_claim | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| verify_claim | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| withdraw_claim | no tags | |
| supersede_claim | no tags | |
| request_agent_key | no tags | |
| claim_agent_key | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_status | no tags | |
| search_claims | no tags | |
| list_check_types | no tags | |
| suggest_checks | no tags | |
| pin_before_work | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_track_record | no tags | |
| get_decay_index | no tags | |
| get_reliance_prior | no tags | |
| get_digest | no tags | |
| audit_ledger | no tags | |
| check_report_citations | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestb38f7d16dfacbdb9
Scanned2026-11-05
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.1.0.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Countersign by Signalry can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.