MCP server for interacting with the Scryfall MTG API
Nothing to run from here
Yuna0x0 Anilist is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
97/100
trust score
8
downloads a day
remote
at its publisher
545
downloads in 30d
What it does
Access and interact with anime and manga data seamlessly. Retrieve detailed information about your…
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http yuna0x0-anilist-mcp https://server.smithery.ai/@yuna0x0/anilist-mcp/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${SMITHERY_API_KEY}'
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# delete_activity, get_activity, get_user_activity and 41 more
It needs SMITHERY_API_KEY (Bearer token for Smithery authentication): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.
Yuna0x0 Anilist costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
SMAll 122 servers
smithery122 servers
25 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads SMITHERY_API_KEY (Bearer token for Smithery authentication) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx SMITHERY_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows).
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http yuna0x0-anilist-mcp https://server.smithery.ai/@yuna0x0/anilist-mcp/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${SMITHERY_API_KEY}'Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header (Bearer token for Smithery authentication) if you want to set it.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
44 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
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Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Yuna0x0 Anilist or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 97 / 100
Release 1.3.7 · scanned 6 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score97
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digestd1c7ace4365ebbee56c7d2a18b2732a5008206ae86581dd53bfb9a642bb5385f
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 97
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| delete_activity | no tags | |
| get_activity | no tags | |
| get_user_activity | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| post_message_activity | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "post_message" |
| post_text_activity | no tags | |
| add_list_entry | no tags | |
| get_user_anime_list | no tags | |
| get_user_manga_list | no tags | |
| remove_list_entry | no tags | |
| update_list_entry | no tags | |
| get_anime | no tags | |
| favourite_anime | no tags | |
| favourite_manga | no tags | |
| get_manga | no tags | |
| favourite_studio | no tags | |
| get_genres | no tags | |
| get_media_tags | no tags | |
| get_site_statistics | no tags | |
| get_studio | no tags | |
| get_character | no tags | |
| favourite_character | no tags | |
| favourite_staff | no tags | |
| get_todays_birthday_characters | no tags | |
| get_todays_birthday_staff | no tags | |
| get_staff | no tags | |
| get_recommendation | no tags | |
| get_recommendations_for_media | no tags | |
| search_activity | no tags | |
| search_anime | no tags | |
| search_character | no tags | |
| search_manga | no tags | |
| search_staff | no tags | |
| search_studio | no tags | |
| search_user | no tags | |
| delete_thread | no tags | |
| get_thread | no tags | |
| get_thread_comments | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "read_comment" |
| get_full_user_info | no tags | |
| follow_user | no tags | |
| get_authorized_user | no tags | |
| get_user_recent_activity | no tags | |
| get_user_profile | no tags | |
| get_user_stats | no tags | |
| update_user | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestd1c7ace4365ebbee
Scanned2026-10-06
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.3.7.
1.3.7
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Yuna0x0 Anilist can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.