Reviews the code, the identities and the exposure of one service, and writes down what it found rather than a score.
Built for: The engineer given a week to answer whether a service is safe enough to put in front of customers.
The button opens the checkout, where the 6 servers and 4 skills are listed one by one. Every member is free, so the checkout lists them and asks for no card.
The reason to buy a stack rather than five listings: each line below needs more than one member connected at the same time.
Scan an MCP server's own source for secrets, injection risk and misconfiguration before it is added to anything.
Review authentication and authorisation code statically — session handling, identity checks, permission gaps.
Look up an attacker technique in MITRE ATT&CK and check whether the detection for it exists at all.
Check an address against AbuseIPDB when a log line raises the question of who that was.
What each part contributes, and why it was picked over the obvious alternative. Prices and permissions are read from the listings, so nothing here can disagree with the catalogue.
Scans an MCP server's code for shell, SQL and SSRF sinks fed by tool input, over-broad tools and hardcoded secrets — the check that belongs before an install, not after.
MITRE ATT&CK lookups and detection-coverage analysis, so a review talks about named techniques instead of adjectives.
Checks the reputation of an address from inside the review, which is the question a suspicious log line always raises next.
The code under review, its history and the merge request the findings will be attached to.
Read-only access to see what data the service can actually reach — the difference between a theoretical exposure and a real one.
The public surface as DNS presents it: what resolves, what points where, and which record nobody remembers creating.
A static review specifically for authentication and authorisation flaws, which is where most real findings in an application review come from.
Turns the dependency audit into the specific upgrades, so the supply-chain half of the review ends with actions.
Installs the external repository scanner from a pinned, reviewable commit — a supply-chain habit worth having in a security desk of all places.
Answers what breaks if this changes, which is what turns a finding into a fix somebody is willing to merge.
Every member is free, so the monthly figure is $0 whatever you do with the stack: nothing here is billed by the call, and only adding a paid member could change it.
| Part | What you are paying for | Monthly, as quoted |
|---|---|---|
| Auditor | Free | — |
| Mitre | Free | — |
| Abuseipdb | Free | — |
| GitLab | Free | — |
| Database Postgres | Free | — |
| Cloudflare DNS | Free | — |
| Skills | ||
| Auth Review | Free · context cost only | — |
| Audit Dependencies | Free · context cost only | — |
| repo-scan | Free · context cost only | — |
| Impact Analysis with GitNexus | Free · context cost only | — |
| Everything above | $0 of servers plus $0 of skills, the same in a quiet month and a busy one | $0/mo |
Subscriptions at their monthly plan price; one-off licences spread over 12 months.
Install only these and the bill is nothing: 6 servers and 4 skills, and all 48 tools.
Nothing in this stack carries a call allowance, so nothing here can run out before the month does. The bill is decided when you install it, not when you use it.
The spend cap is one figure for the whole account, set in your dashboard and checked when an order is placed. On the call path what stops a retry loop is the plan's call allowance and its rate limit, and a refused call is never billed.
The steps below come before the install lines: what to decide and scope before connecting anything, in the order it matters. The lines themselves follow, part by part, for the client you pick.
npx mcprush@latest stack add sec-review writes all 6 servers into Claude Code’s config in one go — or run the lines below one by one. The 4 skills are not included — add them with lines 07–10.
ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY — Your AbuseIPDB API key (abuseipdb.com/account/api)GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN — GitLab personal access token for local stdio usePOSTGRES_HOST — Database hostPOSTGRES_USER — Database user (a read-only user is recommended)POSTGRES_PASSWORD — Database password (or use POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE)POSTGRES_DATABASE — Database nameCLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN — Cloudflare API token with DNS edit rights (dash.cloudflare.com/profile/api-tokens)CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID — ID of the zone (domain) to manage, from the domain's Overview pageSet them where you start Claude Code — export ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=… in your shell profile on macOS and Linux, setx ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY "…" on Windows, then open a new terminal. Claude Code reads them at start; the config keeps only the names.
# 01 · Auditor
claude mcp add --scope user auditor-mcp '--' npx -y @guardbee/mcp-server-auditor
# 02 · Mitre
claude mcp add --scope user mitre-mcp '--' npx -y mitre-mcp
# 03 · Abuseipdb
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=${ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY}' --transport stdio abuseipdb-mcp '--' npx -y mcp-abuseipdb
# 04 · GitLab
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN=${GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN}' --transport stdio zereight-gitlab-mcp '--' npx -y @zereight/mcp-gitlab
# 05 · Database Postgres
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'POSTGRES_HOST=${POSTGRES_HOST}' --env 'POSTGRES_USER=${POSTGRES_USER}' --env 'POSTGRES_PASSWORD=${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}' --env 'POSTGRES_DATABASE=${POSTGRES_DATABASE}' --transport stdio database-postgres-mcp '--' npx -y @database-mcp/postgres
# 06 · Cloudflare DNS
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=${CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN}' --env 'CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID=${CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID}' --transport stdio cloudflare-dns-mcp '--' npx -y @thelord/mcp-cloudflare
# 07 · Auth Review
npx mcprush@latest skill add descope/auth-review
# 08 · Audit Dependencies
npx mcprush@latest skill add payloadcms/audit-dependencies
# 09 · repo-scan
npx mcprush@latest skill add agenticweb/repo-scan
# 10 · Impact Analysis with GitNexus
npx mcprush@latest skill add abhigyanpatwari/impact-analysis-with-gitnexusnpx).Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser RemoteSigned once, or type npx.cmd instead of npx (codex.cmd, gemini.cmd, grok.cmd likewise). PowerShell 7 needs neither.Nothing is connected until you approve it in Claude Code. mcprush is not in the path and meters nothing here.
Installed together, these tool surfaces add up. It is the first thing a security reviewer asks for, so what has been counted — and what nobody has counted yet — is on the page rather than in a PDF.
| Member | Tool surface | Write tools |
|---|---|---|
| Mitre | imported | 4 |
| Cloudflare DNS | imported | 3 |
| Abuseipdb | not imported | not recorded |
| Database Postgres | not imported | not recorded |
| GitLab | not imported | not recorded |
A stack's blast radius is the union of its members, not the worst of them. That union cannot be taken here, because 3 members of 6 have no imported tool surface — so the figure a review asks for is missing rather than low, and a member marked not imported is one nobody has counted rather than one that cannot write.
A stack is a default, not a verdict. These are the substitutions the maintainer would make, and what each one costs or saves.
A second scanner over the same package, with different engines behind it; run it when a finding needs a second opinion rather than instead of the first.
The same review against a repository hosted on Bitbucket, for teams whose code never moved to GitLab.
Written by the maintainer, kept on the page rather than in a support thread.
It is not a penetration test. Everything here reads code, configuration and public reputation data — nothing here attacks a running system.
It cannot revoke anything. Findings come out as text; changing a role, a key or a rule stays with whoever owns it.
A clean pass here is not a certification. The MCP scanner covers MCP servers, the auth review covers your code, and neither speaks for the other.
A stack has an owner: whoever keeps it re-checks the combination when a member changes, and the members themselves are published by the people named on each row.
Tools to prepare database changes and review their effects before rollout.
Designs the endpoint, wires the auth and the payment, and reviews the shape before it is public and permanent.
Takes a green branch to a running deployment, and keeps the DNS, the cluster and the access list honest on the way.