Name: TenderAPI
Author: tenderapi

TenderAPI MCP

Search EU public tenders from TED and national portals by CPV code, country, buyer or value.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 5 tools v1.0.0

No reviews yet by tenderapi The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

96/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Search EU public tenders from TED and national portals by CPV code, country, buyer or value.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http tenderapi-tenderapi-mcp https://api.tenderapi.eu/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   get_organisation_tenders, get_tender, search_cpv_codes and 2 more

It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer token with your TenderAPI key, e.g. 'Bearer tapi_...'. Get one at https://dash.tenderapi.eu): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

TenderAPI costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

tenderapi1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer token with your TenderAPI key, e.g. 'Bearer tapi_...'. Get one at https://dash.tenderapi.eu) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http tenderapi-tenderapi-mcp https://api.tenderapi.eu/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Bearer token with your TenderAPI key, e.g. 'Bearer tapi_...'. Get one at https://dash.tenderapi.eu. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

5 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

List tenders an organisation published as buyer (purchase history) or won as supplier (award history).

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
organisationId	string	yes	Organisation id (UUID) from search_organisations or a tender's buyer.id.
roles	null/array	no	buyer returns what the organisation procured, winner what it was awarded. Default both.
sortBy	string	no	Sort field. Default publicationDate.
sortOrder	string	no	Sort direction.
limit	integer	no	Results per page, 1-50. Default 10.
cursor	string	no	page.nextCursor from the previous call.

Fetch one tender by id, including its full abstract and winners.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
id	string	yes	Tender id (UUID) as returned by search_tenders.

Look up Common Procurement Vocabulary codes by English keywords or browse by code prefix. Call this before search_tenders when the user describes a subject rather than giving codes.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
query	string	yes	English keywords describing the subject (for example "software consultancy"), or a numeric code prefix such as 4523 to browse a branch.
limit	integer	no	Maximum codes to return. Default 20.

Find buyers and suppliers by name and country. Use the returned id with get_organisation_tenders.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
name	string	no	Part of the organisation name, any language.
countries	null/array	no	ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 country codes.
limit	integer	no	Results per page, 1-50. Default 10.
cursor	string	no	page.nextCursor from the previous call.

Search public procurement notices from TED and national portals by CPV code, buyer country, status, dates, estimated value and title. Returns a page of tenders with links to the official notices.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
query	string	no	Substring matched against the tender title. Titles are written in the buyer's national language, so prefer cpvCodes plus buyerCountries for topic searches.
cpvCodes	null/array	no	8-digit CPV codes. A parent code such as 72000000 also matches all of its child codes. Use search_cpv_codes to find codes.
buyerCountries	null/array	no	ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 country codes of the buyer, for example AUT, DEU, SVN.
buyerName	string	no	Part of the buying organisation's name.
sources	null/array	no	Portals to include. Default is all.
statuses	null/array	no	Tender statuses. open means not yet awarded or cancelled; combine with deadlineFrom to find tenders that still accept bids.
serviceTypes	null/array	no	Contract nature.
publishedFrom	string	no	Earliest publication date, YYYY-MM-DD or RFC3339.
publishedUntil	string	no	Latest publication date, YYYY-MM-DD or RFC3339.
deadlineFrom	string	no	Earliest submission deadline, YYYY-MM-DD or RFC3339. Set to today's date to exclude expired tenders.
deadlineUntil	string	no	Latest submission deadline, YYYY-MM-DD or RFC3339. A plain date includes the whole day.
minValue	null/number	no	Minimum estimated contract value in currency.
maxValue	null/number	no	Maximum estimated contract value in currency.
currency	string	no	Currency of minValue and maxValue. Default EUR.
sortBy	string	no	Sort field. Default publicationDate.
sortOrder	string	no	Sort direction. Defaults: publicationDate desc, deadline asc, estimatedValue desc.
limit	integer	no	Results per page, 1-50. Default 10.
cursor	string	no	page.nextCursor from the previous call. Filters must stay identical.

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install TenderAPI or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100

Release 1.0.0 · scanned 23 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score96

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilityminimal

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest357e5cbdb4d40bef98b24ca91ec0303a7cd591528f42bd5b487f66644abd2eb8

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	minimal	capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−0
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
get_organisation_tenders	no tags
get_tender	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: keyword "fetch"
search_cpv_codes	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: keyword "browse"
search_organisations	no tags
search_tenders	no tags

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest357e5cbdb4d40bef

Scanned2026-10-23

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.