Name: Termalin Web
Author: termal

Termalin Web MCP

Run commands and read/write files on your servers over Termalin's keyless tunnels (hosted MCP).

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 18 tools v1.0.0

No reviews yet by termal The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

90/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Run commands and read/write files on your servers over Termalin's keyless tunnels (hosted MCP).

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http termalin-web-mcp https://termal.in/api/v1/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   hosts_list, generate_password, ssh_exec and 15 more

It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer <API key> — create one at termal.in/account (API keys & MCP section)): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

Termalin Web costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

termal1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer <API key> — create one at termal.in/account (API keys & MCP section)) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http termalin-web-mcp https://termal.in/api/v1/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Bearer <API key> — create one at termal.in/account (API keys & MCP section). You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

18 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

List the servers reachable through Termalin (your tunnel agents). Returns id, name, whether the server is online, the user commands run as, when it was last seen, its country, ip (the public address the server's Connector connects from; null until it has connected), and ownerNote — what the owner wrote about that server for you (what it is, what to leave alone); follow it. 'policy' says what you m

No parameter schema on file.

Generate a strong random password — handy when creating a user or setting a password on a server. Returns the password only; nothing is stored.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
length	integer	no	length (default 20, 8-128)

Run a single shell command on one of your servers and return its combined output and exit code. Runs keyless over Termalin's tunnel — no SSH key, and the server needs no open inbound port. Each call is a fresh shell (cd does not persist — chain with &&). Keep a call under about 90 seconds: for anything longer (installs, builds, backups) use job_start and check on it with job_status.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id from hosts_list
command	string	yes	Shell command to execute
username	string	no	Login user (defaults to the tunnel's user, else root)
timeoutSeconds	number	no	Max seconds to wait (default 60). Calls longer than about 90 seconds are usually cut off by the network before they answer — run long jobs in the background instead.

Run the same shell command on several of your servers at once and return each server's output and exit code. Use it to compare or check a fleet (disk space, versions, a service's state) in one call instead of one call per server. Up to 10 servers; the same 90-second limit as ssh_exec applies.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
hosts	array	yes	Server ids (or exact names) from hosts_list
command	string	yes	Shell command to execute on each server
timeoutSeconds	number	no	Max seconds to wait per server (default 60, at most 80)

Start a long-running shell command on a server in the background and return a job id right away. Use it for anything that can take more than about a minute — package installs, builds, backups, migrations, large downloads. The job keeps running after this call returns and survives the connection closing; its output goes to a log you read with job_status. The command runs from the login user's home

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id (or exact name) from hosts_list
command	string	yes	Shell command to run in the background
username	string	no	Login user (defaults to the server's user, else root). Use the same one for job_status/job_stop.

Check a background job started with job_start: whether it is still running or finished (with its exit code), when it started, and the last lines of its output.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id (or exact name) from hosts_list
job	string	yes	Job id returned by job_start
lines	integer	no	How many last lines of output to return (default 40, at most 500)
username	string	no	Login user the job was started as (if one was given to job_start)

Stop a background job started with job_start (asks it to terminate, then forces it after two seconds). Does nothing if the job already finished.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id (or exact name) from hosts_list
job	string	yes	Job id returned by job_start
username	string	no	Login user the job was started as (if one was given to job_start)

List the recent background jobs on a server (newest first): id, state, start time and the command.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id (or exact name) from hosts_list
username	string	no	Login user whose jobs to list (defaults to the server's user, else root)

Numbers Termalin's monitoring collects from the user's servers every minute, without running anything now: CPU, memory, disk, load, network, the busiest processes, failed services, containers, certificates. Without host: one line per server with its latest numbers. With host: that server's latest sample in full and the average and peak over the last hours (default 6). Use it for 'how is the

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	no	Server name or id from hosts_list. Leave out for all servers.
hours	number	no	How far back to summarise, in hours. Default 6.

Make an encrypted backup of one of the user's servers now, through Termalin's backup job for that server, and wait for it (up to about a minute; a longer one keeps running and shows up in backup_list). Call it BEFORE a risky change — a migration, a config rewrite, a bulk delete — and say so in 'label'. The server needs a backup job set up in the Termalin cabinet (that is where the owner chooses th

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id or exact name from hosts_list
job	string	no	Name of the backup job when the server has several (default: the first)
label	string	no	Why this backup is being made, e.g. 'before upgrading postgres'

The backup jobs and recent archives of one of the user's servers: when each ran, whether it succeeded, how big it is and where it is stored. Use it to check that a backup exists before a risky change, or to see whether last night's backup worked.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id or exact name from hosts_list

What Termalin's monitoring says is wrong with the user's servers right now (disk filling up, memory or load pinned, a failed service, a restarting container, a certificate about to expire, a server offline), plus what cleared in the last seven days. Start here when asked how the servers are doing. Covers servers with metrics switched on.

No parameter schema on file.

List a directory on one of your servers over SFTP. Returns each entry's name, whether it's a directory, size and modified time. Runs keyless over Termalin's tunnel, like ssh_exec.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id from hosts_list
path	string	no	Directory to list (default the login home, ".")
username	string	no	Login user (defaults to the tunnel's user, else root)

Read a text file from one of your servers over SFTP and return its contents. Files over 512 KB or non-text (binary) files are refused — use ssh_exec (e.g. sed/tail) for those.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id from hosts_list
path	string	yes	Absolute or home-relative file path
username	string	no	Login user (defaults to the tunnel's user, else root)

Create or overwrite a text file on one of your servers over SFTP. 'content' is written as UTF-8. Capped at 512 KB; for binary uploads use a terminal/scp instead.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id from hosts_list
path	string	yes	Destination file path (created or overwritten)
content	string	yes	UTF-8 text to write
username	string	no	Login user (defaults to the tunnel's user, else root)

Run a database query on one of your servers — passwordless. It executes the engine's own client on the host over Termalin's keyless tunnel, using the database's local trust (Postgres peer auth via sudo -u postgres, MySQL/MariaDB unix-socket via sudo mysql, redis-cli, mongosh, sqlite3) — so no database password is needed or stored anywhere. Read-only by default: only SELECT/SHOW-style statement

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id from hosts_list
engine	string	no	Database engine on that server (default postgres)
query	string	yes	The statement / command / expression to run
database	string	no	Database name (for sqlite: the .db file path)
username	string	no	SSH login user (defaults to the tunnel's user, else root)
allowWrites	boolean	no	Allow a non-read statement (full-access keys only; default false)
timeoutSeconds	number	no	Max seconds to wait (default 60). Calls longer than about 90 seconds are usually cut off by the network before they answer — run long jobs in the background instead.

List the tables / collections / keys of a database on one of your servers — passwordless, over the same local-client path as data_query.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id from hosts_list
engine	string	no	Database engine on that server (default postgres)
database	string	no	Database name (for sqlite: the .db file path)
username	string	no	SSH login user (defaults to the tunnel's user, else root)

Describe one table of a database on one of your servers: its columns with type, whether they can be empty, default value and primary key. Call it before writing a query against a table you have not seen. Works for postgres, mysql, mariadb and sqlite.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Server id (or exact name) from hosts_list
table	string	yes	Table name, optionally with its schema (e.g. users or public.users)
engine	string	no	Database engine on that server (default postgres)
database	string	no	Database name (for sqlite: the .db file path)
username	string	no	SSH login user (defaults to the server's user, else root)

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Termalin Web or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 90 / 100

Release 1.0.0 · scanned 23 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score90

Findings0 threat · 21 capability

Capabilityhigh

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest1aa542a57d27587747eaf0a9347ba613a6b1d1da9d8e5abbf242af2db2ea11d7

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 90

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	high	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−6
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
hosts_list	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
generate_password	no tags
ssh_exec	code-execexternal-sink	code-exec: keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"; external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true
ssh_exec_many	code-execexternal-sink	code-exec: keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"; external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true
job_start	code-execexternal-sink	code-exec: parameter "command"; external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true
job_status	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
job_stop	external-sink	external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true
job_list	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
server_metrics	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
backup_create	external-sink	external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true
backup_list	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
alerts_list	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
sftp_list	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
sftp_read	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
sftp_write	external-sink	external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true
data_query	external-sink	external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true
data_tables	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
data_schema	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

flow-1

Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest1aa542a57d275877

Scanned2026-10-23

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.