Verified conversions across 205 color spaces: CSS strings, gamut checks, .cube LUTs
Nothing to run from here
Apolo is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
trust score
1
tool declared
local
runs on your machine
4k
downloads
What it does
Apolo is a free, open-source image optimizer for macOS, Windows and Linux, with an MCP server so your AI agent can analyze, optimize, compare formats at the same perceived quality (SSIMULACRA 2) and convert whole folders, all on your own computer. Same engines and same output as cwebp, cjpeg, oxipng, avifenc and cjxl. It never overwrites or deletes your originals.
Claude Desktop: download the .mcpb for your system from the latest release (macOS, Windows x64/ARM64, Linux x64/ARM64) and open it: https://github.com/webcafeina/Apolo/releases/latest
Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code…: install the Apolo app, which ships apolo-mcp inside, then for example:
claude mcp add --scope user apolo -- "/Applications/Apolo.app/Contents/MacOS/apolo-mcp" (macOS)
claude mcp add --scope user apolo -- "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Apolo\apolo-mcp.exe" (Windows)
claude mcp add --scope user apolo -- /usr/bin/apolo-mcp (Linux)
Full guide for every agent: https://apolo.webcafeina.com/en/agents/
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download Apolo-1.0.1-macos.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is a95731e3bb654e46393222efdb5a2be15bc7ee7814415f01d32b6e5caa408bbf
The full guide: https://github.com/webcafeina/Apolo/releases/download/v1.0.1/Apolo-1.0.1-macos.mcpb
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Apolo as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download Apolo-1.0.1-macos.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is a95731e3bb654e46393222efdb5a2be15bc7ee7814415f01d32b6e5caa408bbf
The full guide: https://github.com/webcafeina/Apolo/releases/download/v1.0.1/Apolo-1.0.1-macos.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under GPL-3.0
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Apolo or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 93 / 100
Release 1.0.2 · scanned 5 Nov 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings12 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest930942b5d3573e4aa8f1066f308762e1671d72fba7661acd9407b3ae6ae052d0
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
1 of the 1 recovered tools are registered only when mensaje === null || typeof mensaje !== "object" || mensaje.id === undefined is false (empaquetado/claude/apolo/servidor/apolo-mcp.mjs:118) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes none of the recovered tools.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
No tool is registered unconditionally · 1 only when mensaje === null || typeof mensaje !== "object" || mensaje.id === undefined is false (empaquetado/claude/apolo/servidor/apolo-mcp.mjs:118) — typically when a key or option is configured. All 1 are in the table below and were analysed; the conditional ones are marked.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| instalar_apolo conditional | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest930942b5d3573e4a
Scanned2026-11-05
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.0.2.
1.0.2
5 Nov 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
1.0.1
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
—
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