Control a real Chrome browser to complete any task: fill forms, extract data, book flights.
Nothing to run from here
Chrome Bridge is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
94/100
trust score
15
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
4k
downloads in 30d
What it does
67 tools that let Claude Code, or any MCP client, work in the Chrome you already use: navigation, forms, DOM inspection, network monitoring and mocking, accessibility, SEO and security audits, visual regression with screenshot diffs, and a headless mode for CI.
Fewer tokens by design. Short element refs instead of the screenshot-and-click loop, fill_form fills many fields in one call, big tables are filtered server-side. Against Claude in Chrome (paired runs, 29/09/2026, n=5 per task, same model): 2.8-4.3× lower token cost, up to 9.3× fewer turns, 15 correct answers out of 15 against 12. Method and raw runs: https://github.com/frsorrentino/chrome-bridge/blob/main/bench/RESULTS.md
Setup has two parts, both needed:
- The MCP server: the install line on this page (Node.js 18+).
- The browser extension, Chrome Bridge for Claude (Chrome 135+), installed after the server. Web Store search rarely finds it, so use the direct link: https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/chrome-bridge-for-claude/bioknpaeahidbelaljjohjofiloeodmb
For execute_js, enable Allow user scripts in chrome://extensions, Chrome Bridge, Details.
Source, full quickstart and docs: https://github.com/frsorrentino/chrome-bridge
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. claude mcp add --scope user chrome-bridge-mcp '--' npx -y chrome-bridge-mcp
2. Install the Chrome extension from this direct link (Web Store search rarely finds it): https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/chrome-bridge-for-claude/bioknpaeahidbelaljjohjofiloeodmb
3. Restart Claude Code
The full guide: https://github.com/frsorrentino/chrome-bridge#quickstart
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Chrome Bridge as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. claude mcp add --scope user chrome-bridge-mcp '--' npx -y chrome-bridge-mcp
2. Install the Chrome extension from this direct link (Web Store search rarely finds it): https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/chrome-bridge-for-claude/bioknpaeahidbelaljjohjofiloeodmb
3. Restart Claude Code
The full guide: https://github.com/frsorrentino/chrome-bridge#quickstart
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
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Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Chrome Bridge or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 1.30.7 · scanned 25 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings8 threat · 3 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digestba9a175cba29802260c4d324865b4f7d2d20e6ab9a53f5e98ab6a1041ff8e68c
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (67 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| get_status | no tags | |
| get_tabs | no tags | |
| navigate | no tags | |
| screenshot | no tags | |
| execute_js | no tags | |
| click | no tags | |
| type_text | no tags | |
| read_page | no tags | |
| get_page_info | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "get_page" |
| get_storage | no tags | |
| query_dom | no tags | |
| get_css_styles | no tags | |
| modify_dom | no tags | |
| inject_css | no tags | |
| read_console | no tags | |
| monitor_network | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| create_tab | no tags | |
| wait_for | no tags | |
| scroll | no tags | |
| set_storage | no tags | |
| fill_form | no tags | |
| viewport_resize | no tags | |
| element_screenshot | no tags | |
| full_page_screenshot | no tags | |
| measure_spacing | no tags | |
| watch_dom | no tags | |
| emulate_media | no tags | |
| animations | no tags | |
| frames | no tags | |
| perf_trace | no tags | |
| screencast | no tags | |
| lighthouse | no tags | |
| heap_snapshot | no tags | |
| hover | no tags | |
| press_key | no tags | |
| get_frames | no tags | |
| tab_action | no tags | |
| upload_file | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "upload_file" |
| dismiss_overlays | no tags | |
| handle_dialogs | no tags | |
| find_text | no tags | |
| network_rules | no tags | |
| screenshot_diff | no tags | |
| track_events | no tags | |
| cookie_audit | no tags | |
| handoff | no tags | |
| watch | no tags | |
| read_form | no tags | |
| audit | no tags | |
| find_setting | no tags | |
| extract_table | no tags | |
| drag_and_drop | no tags | |
| clipboard | no tags | |
| set_geolocation | no tags | |
| manage_downloads | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download", parameter "url" with "download" in the description |
| capture_downloads | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| save_page | no tags | |
| http_request | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "http_request" |
| move_tab | no tags | |
| tile_windows | no tags | |
| window_layout | no tags | |
| http_auth | no tags | |
| session_fixture | no tags | |
| get_interactives | no tags | |
| extract | no tags | |
| assert | no tags | |
| session_record | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestba9a175cba298022
Scanned2026-10-25
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 1.30.7. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
1.30.7
25 Oct 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
1.30.6
23 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.30.5
17 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.30.4
17 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.30.3
15 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.30.2
15 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.30.0
14 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.29.3
14 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.29.2
9 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.29.1
8 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.29.0
6 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.28.0
2 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.26.0
29 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.24.0
28 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.23.0
26 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.20.0
24 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.17.0
11 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
1.16.1
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
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Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
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Any signed-in account that does not publish Chrome Bridge can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.