Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
Veille is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
99/100
trust score
13
tools declared
local
or remote
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downloads a day
What it does
Validate emails, domains, IPs, VAT numbers and IBANs in milliseconds to block fake sign-ups, bots a…
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'VEILLE_API_KEY=${VEILLE_API_KEY}' --transport stdio veille-mcp '--' npx -y @veilleio/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# search_endpoints, get_endpoint, call_endpoint and 10 more
It needs VEILLE_API_KEY: this reads it from your environment, so export it first. Remote: OAuth sign-in · Package: API key.
Veille costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
VEAll 1 server
veille1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one can run either way — at an address its publisher runs, or as a process under your own user, with your files and your network — and this marketplace is in the path of neither.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads VEILLE_API_KEY (Veille API key) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx VEILLE_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'VEILLE_API_KEY=${VEILLE_API_KEY}' --transport stdio veille-mcp '--' npx -y @veilleio/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Or connect to its publisher’s address
Its publisher also runs it at https://mcp.veille.io/: nothing to start on your machine, and this marketplace is not in the path.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http veille-mcp https://mcp.veille.io/Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: VEILLE_API_KEY — Veille API key.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
13 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Search the … Veille endpoints by website, keyword or path (for example "amazon", "linkedin job", "zillow"). Returns endpoint names to use with get_endpoint and call_endpoint.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | Maximum number of results (default 25). |
Returns the description and parameters (names, types, required, allowed values) of one endpoint.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | — |
Calls one Veille endpoint with its parameters and returns the result. Each call consumes credits. Use get_endpoint first to learn the parameters.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | Endpoint name, e.g. intelligence_email. |
| params | object | no | Parameters as documented by get_endpoint. |
Retrieve real-time usage statistics and credit balance for your Veille account.
No parameter schema on file.
Check any domain instantly. Detects disposable email providers, public webmail, relay services, and education domains. Returns DNS health with MX provider detection, domain history, and optional SSL/…
No parameter schema on file.
Validate any email address in a single call. Detects disposable and temporary inboxes, identifies role accounts, public webmail, relay services, and returns a 0-100 risk score. For deep deliverabilit…
No parameter schema on file.
Deep email deliverability verification. Performs full Email Validation plus SMTP inbox check, catch-all detection, and returns a qualification verdict (valid, invalid, risky, disposable, unknown).
No parameter schema on file.
Assess the reputation of any IP address. Detects VPNs, proxies, Tor exit nodes, datacenter hosting, abusive traffic, and bots. Returns geolocation, network owner, and a 0-100 threat score.
No parameter schema on file.
Validate any phone number in E.164 format. Detects disposable and virtual numbers, identifies carrier and line type (mobile/fixed/VoIP), returns country and timezone, and computes a 0-100 risk score.
No parameter schema on file.
Infrastructure health for an engine or endpoint over the last hour. Not scoped to your account or tenant. Enabled per account: HTTP 403 means contact support to activate it.
No parameter schema on file.
Validate a European VAT number against the VIES database. Returns company name, registered address, and validity status for any EU member state.
No parameter schema on file.
Validate any IBAN and retrieve associated bank details. Returns the BIC/SWIFT code, bank name, country, BBAN structural breakdown, and SEPA zone membership.
No parameter schema on file.
Get current ECB exchange rates for any supported base currency. Optionally filter to specific target currencies. Updated daily from the European Central Bank.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Veille or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 99 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 7 Nov 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score99
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest2ed0d01e1fadce32f69aa01db8b200b92e0d7c112005e61fd0a04f9cd6f46cba
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 99
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
3 of the 4 recovered tools are registered only when MODE === "tools" is false (dist/server.js:28) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes none of the recovered tools.
1 of the 4 recovered tools are registered only when usage holds (dist/server.js:164) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes none of the recovered tools.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
No tool is registered unconditionally · (1) 3 only when MODE === "tools" is false (dist/server.js:28) · (2) 1 only when usage holds (dist/server.js:164) — typically when a key or option is configured. All 4 are in the table below and were analysed; the conditional ones are marked.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_endpoints conditional (1) | no tags | |
| get_endpoint conditional (1) | no tags | |
| call_endpoint conditional (1) | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| usage conditional (2) | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest2ed0d01e1fadce32
Scanned2026-11-07
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Veille can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.