MCP Server for Z.AI - A Model Context Protocol server that provides AI capabilities
VERAX is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
The body an agent asks before it acts: decide, approve, and keep a signed record on your machine.
Quickstart
This package runs as a local HTTP server (Streamable HTTP), not over stdio, so a client cannot start it as a process. Start it in a terminal with npx -y @verax-ai/body and keep it running, then add the address it listens on to your client as a remote server; that address is not recorded here, so there is no entry to copy.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts VERAX as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This package runs as a local HTTP server (Streamable HTTP), not over stdio, so a client cannot start it as a process. Start it in a terminal with npx -y @verax-ai/body and keep it running, then add the address it listens on to your client as a remote server; that address is not recorded here, so there is no entry to copy.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Reads one memory item this tenant stored earlier with memory.put, by its id.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
Writes one memory item for this tenant, or replaces the item with the same id, in the body's state directory on this machine.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
| body | yes | The value to keep, as any JSON: object, array, string, number or boolean. Stored as given and returned as given by memory.get. | |
| source | object | yes | Where the value came from, as a JSON object of your choosing, for example {"kind": "document", "ref": "invoice-2026-09.pdf"}. Required; stored with the item so a later reader can weigh it. |
| validFromMs | number | no | Optional. Unix time in milliseconds from which the item may be served; before it memory.get answers notYetValid. Omit to serve it at once. |
| validUntilMs | number | yes | Required. Unix time in milliseconds after which memory.get answers stale and withholds the body. Pick the moment the fact should no longer be trusted. |
Reads one decision back from the signed ledger by its ref and explains it.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ref | string | yes | — |
Reads this tenant's inbox, the messages placed for it in the body's state directory on this machine, and returns them as a JSON array in arrival order, oldest first.
No parameter schema on file.
Queues one message in this tenant's outbox on this machine for the delivery step the operator runs; this call opens no network connection and nothing leaves the body from it.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| to | string | yes | Recipient address with a host after the last '@', for example ops@example.com. The host, lower-cased, is matched against the policy's egress list. |
| text | string | yes | The message body as plain text. Stored as given in the outbox row. |
| _ref | no | — |
Asks the body to authorize a payment and records the decision; the body never moves money, so authorized: true is a signed permission for a later payment step, not a transfer.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| amountMinor | integer | yes | Amount in the currency's minor unit as a positive integer: cents, kuruş or pence, so 1250 means 12.50. Compared against the policy's cap per call and daily limit. |
| currency | string | yes | ISO 4217 code in upper case, for example USD, EUR or TRY. Must equal the currency the policy's spend rule names. |
| payee | string | yes | Who is to be paid, spelled exactly as the policy's payee list spells it (a merchant or account name). A payee off the list is refused. |
| reference | string | yes | Your own reference for this payment, such as an invoice or order id. Recorded with the authorization; verax reconcile does not read it, and matches a card statement row by a verax:<ref> in its descrip |
| _ref | no | — |
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under Apache-2.0
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install VERAX or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| memory.get | no tags | |
| memory.put | no tags | |
| audit.explain | no tags | |
| message.read | no tags | |
| message.send | no tags | |
| spend | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.5.1. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
No release note was published with this version.
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish VERAX can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.