Neural network swarm orchestration with WebAssembly acceleration and MCP integration
Nothing to run from here
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
tool-list score
26
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Agent leases, signed receipts, watchdogs, and optional paid source-verification evidence.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http vigil-an-outside-witness-for-ai-agents-mcp https://vigilnotary.com/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# vigil_info, vigil_register, vigil_pricing and 23 more
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
VIAll 1 server
vigilnotary1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http vigil-an-outside-witness-for-ai-agents-mcp https://vigilnotary.com/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
26 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Service description, the Ed25519 signing pubkey to verify receipts against, current chain head, and free-tier limits. No key required.
No parameter schema on file.
Create a key. Returns a bearer key shown ONCE — store it; it is your only identity. No email, no account. Starts on the free tier. Creates a persistent identity. The returned key grants full account control; provision it in a trusted client, not a model transcript.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| handle | string | yes | 1-64 chars, lowercase alnum plus - and _. |
The plans and per-tier limits (free, dev, pro). No key required.
No parameter schema on file.
Your current tier, its limits, and how much you've used today. Requires your key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
Notarize work: POST the sha256 (64 hex chars) of anything and get back an Ed25519-signed, timestamped, hash-chained, serial-numbered receipt. Chain position orders submitted records; the timestamp is a signed assertion of Vigil's clock. Free tier: 10/day. Irreversibly publishes the digest, label and account handle in the public chain; no deletion tool exists. It proves signed-data integrity, not t
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| subject_sha256 | string | yes | 64 lowercase hex chars: the sha256 of the thing you are notarizing. |
| label | string | no | Optional human label, <=200 chars. Public — do not put secrets here. |
Fetch a receipt by serial number. Public — anyone can read any receipt.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| serial | integer | yes | The receipt serial number. |
Verify a receipt's hash and Ed25519 signature against a mandatory, independently pinned Ed25519 public key. The key must not come from the receipt being checked. Returns valid=false for tampering, forgery, a wrong signer, or malformed input. Read-only and local to Vigil.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | object | yes | A full receipt object as returned by vigil_notarize / vigil_get_receipt. |
| pubkey_hex | string | yes | Mandatory Ed25519 public key pinned from a trusted out-of-band source; never copy it from the receipt. |
Read a range of receipts to audit chain continuity. Max 1000 per call.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| from_serial | integer | no | First serial (default 1). |
| to_serial | integer | no | Last serial (default = from_serial). |
Arm a dead-man switch. Register an interval and an https webhook; then call vigil_heartbeat before each interval elapses. Miss one and Vigil attempts a signed 'absence' payload to your webhook, retrying failed delivery. Free tier: 1 watchdog. Overwrites an existing watchdog and resets its timer and delivery state. A missed heartbeat sends the supplied message to an external HTTPS recipient; failed
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| name | string | yes | A name for this watchdog, 1-64 chars. |
| interval_s | integer | yes | Seconds allowed between heartbeats, 60..604800. |
| webhook_url | string | yes | An https URL resolving to a public address; fired once on a missed heartbeat. |
| message | string | no | Optional note included in the absence payload, <=2000 chars. |
'Still alive.' Reset a watchdog's timer. Call this at least once per interval. Resets the deadline and delivery state, potentially suppressing an overdue alert or rearming delivery.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| name | string | yes | Watchdog name, 1..64 characters. |
Read a watchdog's state: interval, last beat, whether it is overdue, fired, or exhausted.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| name | string | yes | Watchdog name, 1..64 characters. |
Remove a watchdog. Destructive: deletes its configuration and stops future alerts. No undo or restoration of the previous timer is provided.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| name | string | yes | Watchdog name, 1..64 characters. |
Grant a short-lived, Ed25519-signed LEASE authorizing an agent to perform an action until it expires. A customer-run gateway verifies the lease offline (fail-closed) before letting the action through. This is the guard on a money/data-moving action. Free tier: 1 active lease (guarded agent). Security-sensitive: grants authority. Keep this account key outside the controlled agent. A signed lim stri
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| agent | string | yes | Identifier for the agent being authorized (1-128 chars). |
| action | string | yes | The action class this lease authorizes, e.g. 'stripe.refund' (1-128 chars). |
| ttl_s | integer | yes | Lease lifetime in seconds, 5..604800. Keep it short; renew to extend. |
| lim | string | no | Optional limit string the gateway enforces, e.g. 'amount<=50usd'. |
Extend a lease with a fresh signed token and new expiry. Renewing is how a healthy agent keeps acting; stop renewing (or revoke) and it lapses. Security-sensitive: extends authority and refreshes the offline recheck window. Keep renewal credentials outside the controlled agent.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| lease_id | string | yes | Opaque lease identifier returned by vigil_grant_lease. |
| ttl_s | integer | yes | Requested lease lifetime in seconds, 5..604800; offline trust still ends at recheck_by_ms within 30 seconds. |
Revoke a lease. A compliant v2 gateway refuses the old offline token at recheck_by_ms (at most 30 seconds after issue/renewal), or earlier if it polls revocation. Revocation is not instantaneous. Irreversible for this lease ID; it cannot be renewed again. Already admitted actions are not undone.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| lease_id | string | yes | Opaque lease identifier returned by vigil_grant_lease. |
Public status of a lease (active / expired / revoked). What a gateway polls for revocation. No key required.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| lease_id | string | yes | Opaque lease identifier returned by vigil_grant_lease. |
Offline, FAIL-CLOSED check of a lease token against a mandatory, independently pinned Ed25519 public key. Returns allow=true only for a valid signature before expiry and recheck_by_ms. It does not authenticate the calling agent, enforce action/amount policy, or query live revocation; a customer gateway must do those checks before every provider action. Checks signature, expiry and the signed reche
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| lease | object | yes | A full lease token from vigil_grant_lease. |
| pubkey_hex | string | yes | Mandatory Ed25519 public key pinned from a trusted out-of-band source; never copy it from the lease. |
List your leases and their states.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
Public timestamp submissions to OpenTimestamps calendars. A submission is pending, not an independently verified Bitcoin confirmation. No key required.
No parameter schema on file.
PRO: anchor the current chain head to OpenTimestamps on demand (the chain is auto-anchored every few hours regardless). Sends the public chain-head digest to external OpenTimestamps calendars; submission is not verified Bitcoin confirmation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
Store an opaque blob under a slug (overwrites). Encrypt client-side: the server stores exactly the bytes supplied and cannot enforce client encryption. Send bytes as base64. Free tier: 4 slots, 64KB each. Destructive when the slug exists: previous bytes are replaced with no version history or undo.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| slug | string | yes | 1-64 alnum/-/_ chars. |
| data_base64 | string | yes | The (already-encrypted) bytes, base64-encoded. |
Fetch a journal blob by slug. Returns base64 (decrypt client-side).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| slug | string | yes | Journal slot name, 1..64 ASCII letters, numbers, hyphens, or underscores. |
List your journal slots (slug, size, last-updated).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
Delete a journal slot. Destructive: removes stored bytes with no undo through the API.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
| slug | string | yes | Journal slot name, 1..64 ASCII letters, numbers, hyphens, or underscores. |
Revoke your own key. It stops authenticating immediately. Irreversible. Irreversible: also revokes the account's leases and deletes its watchdogs. Private journal access is lost; public receipts remain. It does not cancel a Stripe subscription.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | no | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates t |
Paid source-local verification with exact evidence and signed receipt. Does not establish absolute truth. Read price and payment requirements before authorizing; settlement spends USDC irreversibly and there is no automatic refund. Identical tool arguments alone are NOT idempotent: retry with the identical arguments, same vigil/idempotency-key metadata and original payment proof.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| source_url | string | yes | — |
| claim | string | yes | — |
| options | object | no | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 20 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 3 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestffc842c6a4a63407c94426c0c0919a5403a0205d3d301cb2c832552fb0588043
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| vigil_info | no tags | |
| vigil_register | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| vigil_pricing | no tags | |
| vigil_usage | no tags | |
| vigil_notarize | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| vigil_get_receipt | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| vigil_verify_receipt | no tags | |
| vigil_chain | no tags | |
| vigil_set_watchdog | external-sink | external-sink: parameter "webhook", declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| vigil_heartbeat | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_watchdog_status | no tags | |
| vigil_delete_watchdog | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_grant_lease | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_renew_lease | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_revoke_lease | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_lease_status | no tags | |
| vigil_verify_lease | no tags | |
| vigil_leases | no tags | |
| vigil_anchors | no tags | |
| vigil_anchor | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| vigil_journal_put | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_journal_get | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| vigil_journal_list | no tags | |
| vigil_journal_delete | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_revoke_key | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| vigil_verify_source | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestffc842c6a4a63407
Scanned2026-10-20
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.1.0.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.