Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
Vulners is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
100/100
trust score
7
tools declared
local
or remote
—
downloads a day
What it does
MCP server for the Vulners.com API
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'VULNERS_API_KEY=${VULNERS_API_KEY}' --transport stdio vulners-mcp '--' uvx vulners-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# bulletin_by_id, search_lucene, audit_software and 4 more
It needs VULNERS_API_KEY: this reads it from your environment, so export it first.
Vulners costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
VUAll 1 server
vulnersCom1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one can run either way — at an address its publisher runs, or as a process under your own user, with your files and your network — and this marketplace is in the path of neither.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need uv (docs.astral.sh/uv): uvx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads VULNERS_API_KEY (Your Vulners API key (https://vulners.com/userinfo)) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx VULNERS_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'VULNERS_API_KEY=${VULNERS_API_KEY}' --transport stdio vulners-mcp '--' uvx vulners-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Or connect to its publisher’s address
Its publisher also runs it at https://mcp.vulners.com/mcp: nothing to start on your machine, and this marketplace is not in the path.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http vulners-mcp https://mcp.vulners.com/mcpFree on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: VULNERS_API_KEY — Your Vulners API key (https://vulners.com/userinfo). You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
🚨 PRIMARY TOOL FOR KNOWN IDs 🚨 Fetch a bulletin by CVE or Vulners ID. Returns a COMPACT triage-card summary by default -- id, title, CVSS3, EPSS, CVE list, and a compact exploitation/AI signal -- NOT the full record. Pass fields=[...] to widen (e.g. add 'description', 'cvss', 'cvss2',…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string/array | yes | Single CVE ID, Vulners ID, or bulletin ID to fetch, or a list of IDs. Supports CVE identifiers (CVE-2024-21762), vendor-specific IDs (RHSA-2024:1234), or Vulners internal IDs. When a list is provided, |
| references | boolean | no | Include the full reference graph (linked advisories, patches, related bulletins) for a SINGLE-ID lookup. Defaults to False: the compact default projection already covers the essentials (CVSS3, EPSS, e |
| fields | array | no | Override the default COMPACT field projection to widen the response. Pass ['*'] to request every field Vulners has for the bulletin (can be very large for popular CVEs). Useful individual fields to ad |
🔍 DISCOVERY TOOL FOR UNKNOWN VULNERABILITIES 🔍 Full-text search in Vulners Knowledge Base using Lucene syntax. Use ONLY when you don't have specific IDs or version information. NEVER use for known CVE/bulletin IDs - use bulletin_by_id instead. NEVER use for specific software versions (e.g.,…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | Lucene query string for searching vulnerabilities. Supports Boolean operators (AND, OR, NOT), field-specific queries, range searches, and wildcard matching. NEVER use for specific software versions - |
| skip | integer | no | Number of results to skip for pagination. Default is 0. |
| size | integer | no | — |
| fields | array | no | Override the default curated per-hit field projection. Pass ['*'] for every field per hit (large responses). If omitted, a curated default is used: id, title, type, cvss, cvss3, epss, published, href, |
🔍 VERSION-SPECIFIC SOFTWARE AUDIT 🔍 Audit specific software versions for known vulnerabilities. Use this when you have exact software version information (e.g., Chrome 138.0.7204.184). NEVER use search_lucene for version-specific software audits.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | yes | Request body containing software list and audit parameters. Should include 'software' array with structured CPE objects (NOT CPE strings) and optional 'match' parameter ('partial' or 'full'). Each CPE |
List supported OS identifiers/versions for Linux package audit. Get available operating systems for vulnerability analysis.
No parameter schema on file.
Linux package audit (RPM/DEB) for a given distro + version. Analyze Linux package vulnerabilities against the Vulners database.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| os | string | yes | Linux distribution identifier (e.g., ubuntu, debian, centos, rhel, fedora). Use get_supported_os() to see available options. |
| version | string | yes | Distribution version/release (e.g., 22.04, 12, 8, 40). Must match a supported version for the specified OS. |
| package | array | yes | Installed packages, each formatted EXACTLY as the target OS's own package manager lists them -- i.e. one line of the output produced by the command get_supported_os() returns for this OS. DEB-based di |
| include_candidates | boolean | no | Whether to include potential matches in results. If None, uses default behavior (typically false). |
Autocomplete helper for search inputs (vendors, products, CVEs, etc.). Get search suggestions from the Vulners database.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | yes | Request body containing autocomplete parameters. Should include 'query' field with partial search term (e.g., 'openssl', 'CVE-2024-', 'microsoft windows'). |
Find CPE strings by vendor+product (latest schema). Search for Common Platform Enumeration identifiers in the Vulners database.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| vendor | string | yes | Vendor name to search for (e.g., 'microsoft', 'google', 'apache', 'oracle'). Case-insensitive. |
| product | string | yes | Product name to search for (e.g., 'windows_10', 'chrome', 'http_server', 'java'). Case-insensitive. |
| size | integer | no | Maximum number of CPE results to return. If None, uses server default. |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source is public, though no licence is declared for it
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Vulners or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 100 / 100
Release 1.15.0 · scanned 15 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score100
Findings1 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digest8def32edfcbbef02f79f291f680f5d95db372c96229b31ddcb3b517b5755fbe0
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 100
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| get_supported_os | no tags | |
| bulletin_by_id | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| search_lucene | no tags | |
| audit_software | no tags | |
| audit_linux_packages | no tags | |
| query_autocomplete | no tags | |
| search_cpe | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest8def32edfcbbef02
Scanned2026-10-15
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 1.15.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
1.15.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Vulners can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.