Comprehensive Model Context Protocol server for managing Home Assistant through AI assistants.
Nothing to run from here
WAGO PLC is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
trust score
1
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
142
downloads in 30d
What it does
Read and monitor WAGO PLC parameters over the WDA REST API. Read-only unless writes are allowed.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'TRANSPORT=${TRANSPORT}' --env 'WAGO_PLC_HOSTS=${WAGO_PLC_HOSTS}' --env 'DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME=${DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME}' --env 'DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD=${DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD}' --env 'WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES=${WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES}' --transport stdio wago-plc-mcp '--' uvx wago-plc-mcp-server
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# list_plcs, get_plc_audit_log, describe_plc and 26 more
It needs TRANSPORT, WAGO_PLC_HOSTS, DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME, DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD, WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES: this reads them from your environment, so export them first.
WAGO PLC costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
WAAll 1 server
WagoAlex1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts WAGO PLC as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need uv (docs.astral.sh/uv): uvx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads TRANSPORT (MCP transport. Fixed to stdio for this package), WAGO_PLC_HOSTS (Comma-separated IPs of the WAGO PLCs, reachable from this machine), DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME (WBM username on the PLCs), DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD (WBM password, same on all listed PLCs), WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES (true lets the agent change parameters, run methods and upload files. Anything else keeps every PLC read-only) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export them in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx TRANSPORT …, setx WAGO_PLC_HOSTS …, setx DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME …, setx DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD …, setx WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'TRANSPORT=${TRANSPORT}' --env 'WAGO_PLC_HOSTS=${WAGO_PLC_HOSTS}' --env 'DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME=${DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME}' --env 'DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD=${DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD}' --env 'WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES=${WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES}' --transport stdio wago-plc-mcp '--' uvx wago-plc-mcp-serverReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: TRANSPORT — MCP transport. Fixed to stdio for this package.; WAGO_PLC_HOSTS — Comma-separated IPs of the WAGO PLCs, reachable from this machine; DEFAULT_PLC_USERNAME — WBM username on the PLCs; DEFAULT_PLC_PASSWORD — WBM password, same on all listed PLCs; WAGO_ALLOW_WRITES — true lets the agent change parameters, run methods and upload files. Anything else keeps every PLC read-only. You set them in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
29 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
List all reachable WAGO PLCs. Use first to find a target IP.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
Get capability summary for a PLC: counts + feature names. Cheap, cached.
No parameter schema on file.
Get a device resource plus the features it exposes (one call).
No parameter schema on file.
Get a feature plus its composition: nested features, contained parameter/method definitions (one call).
No parameter schema on file.
Get an enum definition's cases (value → stringValue). Useful to inspect an enum's full case list directly.
No parameter schema on file.
Get a parameter's definition: writeable, userSetting, dataType, related enum — without reading its value.
No parameter schema on file.
Search parameter IDs by substring/fuzzy match. Returns up to limit matches (default 20, max 255).
No parameter schema on file.
Read a single parameter value. Resolves enum values to human-readable labels.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
Write multiple parameters in one PATCH call. Pre-validates writeability from cache.
No parameter schema on file.
Write a single parameter. Prefer set_parameters for more than one — same PATCH-per-call cost either way.
No parameter schema on file.
For an instance_identity_ref-typed parameter: the class instances that reference it.
No parameter schema on file.
List instance numbers of a class-typed parameter (dataType 'instantiations'). Use get_parameter_instance for detail.
No parameter schema on file.
Get one class-parameter instance: its device, own parameters, and methods (one call).
No parameter schema on file.
Search method IDs by substring/fuzzy match. Returns up to limit matches (default 20).
No parameter schema on file.
Get method metadata with inline inArgs/outArgs signatures. One call gives the full schema needed for invoke_method.
No parameter schema on file.
Invoke a method. Pass arguments as a flat dict {name: value}.
No parameter schema on file.
Poll an async method run. Use after invoke_method(wait=False) to check status.
No parameter schema on file.
List past runs of a method still held server-side (audit/inspection use).
No parameter schema on file.
Free a server-side run result before it expires on its own. Optional housekeeping, not required for correctness.
No parameter schema on file.
List watchlist IDs still active server-side (e.g. after a restart, to find orphans).
No parameter schema on file.
Create a server-side watchlist of parameters for efficient repeated polling.
No parameter schema on file.
Read current values from an existing watchlist. Resets the timeout.
No parameter schema on file.
Delete a watchlist to free server resources before timeout.
No parameter schema on file.
Allocate a file_id for uploading content into a file_id-typed parameter.
No parameter schema on file.
Upload whole file content (base64-encoded) to a file_id from create_file.
No parameter schema on file.
Download a file's content as base64. Pairs with a parameter whose dataType is file_id.
No parameter schema on file.
HEAD a file_id — size/content-type without downloading the body.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source is public; its licence metadata reads NOASSERTION rather than naming a licence
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install WAGO PLC or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 96 / 100
Release 2.4.4 · scanned 15 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings0 threat · 3 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest243ee14208cc5a80e38f3d21070a60a136b66b4775e5f7482e19040c38cb280e
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| list_plcs | no tags | |
| get_plc_audit_log | no tags | |
| describe_plc | no tags | |
| get_device | no tags | |
| get_feature | no tags | |
| get_enum_definition | no tags | |
| get_parameter_definition | no tags | |
| find_parameters | no tags | |
| get_parameter | no tags | |
| get_parameters_bulk | no tags | |
| set_parameters | no tags | |
| set_parameter | no tags | |
| get_parameter_referenced_instances | no tags | |
| list_parameter_instances | no tags | |
| get_parameter_instance | no tags | |
| find_methods | no tags | |
| get_method | no tags | |
| invoke_method | no tags | |
| get_method_run | no tags | |
| list_method_runs | no tags | |
| delete_method_run | no tags | |
| list_watchlists | no tags | |
| create_watchlist | no tags | |
| read_watchlist | no tags | |
| delete_watchlist | no tags | |
| create_file | file-write | file-write: keyword "create_file" in tool name |
| upload_file | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "upload_file" |
| download_file | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| get_file_metadata | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest243ee14208cc5a80
Scanned2026-10-15
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 2.4.4. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
2.4.4
21 Sep 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
2.4.3
18 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
2.4.1
18 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
2.3.3
16 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
2.3.2
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
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