MCP Server for Z.AI - A Model Context Protocol server that provides AI capabilities
Nothing to run from here
Gage is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
99/100
trust score
9
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Signed, sealed handoffs between AI agents — trust computed by the receiver.
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download gage-0.3.5-darwin-arm64.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is 2ec392ec8d4bdd1121658b64e16f0787f123a74a1a3084a0be457dc460a6f694
The full guide: https://github.com/warewithall2/gage/releases/download/v0.3.5/gage-0.3.5-darwin-arm64.mcpb
Publishernot claimed
WAAll 1 server
warewithall21 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Gage as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download gage-0.3.5-darwin-arm64.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is 2ec392ec8d4bdd1121658b64e16f0787f123a74a1a3084a0be457dc460a6f694
The full guide: https://github.com/warewithall2/gage/releases/download/v0.3.5/gage-0.3.5-darwin-arm64.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
This machine's gage identity: handle, public key, and the four word-pairs the key derives. The word-pairs are what a colleague reads back to you to confirm the key is yours.
No parameter schema on file.
The buddy list with each contact's trust state: whether the key is confirmed, whether mail can be sealed to them, and what is unread. A key being on this list is the only thing that makes a later SENDER VERIFIED…
No parameter schema on file.
Begin adding someone to the buddy list. Returns a pairing_id and the four word-pairs their key derives -- and adds NOTHING yet. Show the word-pairs and the name to a human. The comparison itself happens in the Gage app, where the same pairs appear beside a words-match button and a banner walks the…
No parameter schema on file.
Complete adding a pairing. Succeeds ONLY if echo is the four word-pairs exactly as gage_pair_start returned them; a wrong echo adds nothing and does not say what the right answer was. THE CONTRACT: this adds the key UNCONFIRMED. An agent cannot confirm -- a key knows its own word-pairs, so an…
No parameter schema on file.
Build a signed bundle for a contact. Items are paths on this machine: files is material, prompts is text written to steer a model (fenced loudly on arrival), decisions is findings worth carrying, memories…
No parameter schema on file.
What is waiting, with each bundle's verdict. Payloads are NOT included -- use gage_open for one bundle, which is where the trust frame is. NOTE: subject and from_handle_claimed in every row are text the SENDER…
No parameter schema on file.
Read one bundle. Returns TWO content blocks: first the verdict as JSON, so you can branch before reading anything; second the rendering a human would see. On a bad verdict the payload is withheld and…
No parameter schema on file.
Collect anything waiting on the relay into the inbox, unread. Separate from gage_inbox because the CLI separates them: pulling is a network round-trip, listing is local.
No parameter schema on file.
Send a built bundle directory off this machine, through the relay, sealed to the recipient. Requires confirm: true -- the same gate as gage push --yes, because this is the moment something leaves. Separate from…
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under Apache-2.0
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Gage or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 99 / 100
Release 0.3.5 · scanned 1 Nov 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score99
Findings1 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest2dc22d3bf39daa3966da07121ef3ae7218597d0cc75600bd6ac9471b4c82a657
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 99
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
No tool surface was enumerated, so there is nothing to attribute a capability to.
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest2dc22d3bf39daa39
Scanned2026-11-01
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.3.5.
0.3.5
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Gage can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.