Accessibility Ai MCP server. Tools: check color contrast, suggest alt text, check heading hierarchy. Built by MEOK AI Labs.
Free
Nothing to run from here
Tollere is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
Open Installation—
p95 latency
—
call success
local
runs on your machine
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calls last 7d
What it does
Supply chain security for AI-generated code - scans packages, Docker images, and IDE extensions (VS Code, Cursor, JetBrains) before install for typosquats, CVEs, sandwich-pattern attacks, and Docker tag overwriting
Quickstart
# 1 — run it from where its publisher ships it
npx -y @weave_protocol/tollere
# 2 — the plan is chosen at checkout, in the browser
# 3 — ask your agent something
> Supply chain security for AI-generated code - scans packages, Docker images, and IDE extensions (VS Code, Cursor, JetBrains) before install
Publishernot claimed
WEAll 1 server
@weave_protocol1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Tollere as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. It is scanned, signed and pinned to the version you choose — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command.
claude mcp add tollere-mcp -- npx -y @weave_protocol/tollereReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
This is a paid listing, so the CLI has to be signed in and the licence has to be on your account — how the login works. Until then the install stops with the price rather than half-writing a config entry.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
28 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Create a new encrypted vault for storing agent state, memories, and credentials
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Open a vault for reading and writing
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Close and re-encrypt a vault
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Store an encrypted credential in a vault
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Retrieve a credential from a vault
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
List all vaults accessible to an agent
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Store a memory in a vault
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Retrieve memories from a vault
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Request a capability token for accessing a resource
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Verify if a capability token is valid for an action
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Revoke a capability token
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
List capability tokens for an agent
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Delegate a capability to another agent
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Create an isolated execution environment
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Execute code or command in a sandbox
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Promote a sandbox result for real execution
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Destroy a sandbox and clean up resources
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Get results from a sandbox
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Create a policy for redacting sensitive data
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Redact sensitive data from content
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Tokenize PII in text
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Reverse tokenization to get original values
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
List all redaction policies
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Create a cryptographic attestation for an action
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Verify an attestation is valid
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Get attestations for an agent
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Get the chain of attestations
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Export attestations for audit
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Standardmost installed
$19 / month
- 16,000 calls a month, included
- 192 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
Pro
$69 / month
- 160,000 calls a month, included
- 1,920 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
No call is billed on its own, and this plan carries no monthly call limit. $19 a month covers every tool at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: $8.42
$16.58 left
ATrust score 96 / 100
Release 0.2.3 · scanned 25 Aug 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings3 threat · 0 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digestcea57fd40ea6aad85d3bd7454e35aacc37ca7e3ce15b8155534ffe2b0f88ba33
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| tollere_scan_package | no tags | |
| tollere_scan_dependencies | no tags | |
| tollere_check_typosquat | no tags | |
| tollere_check_maintainer | no tags | |
| tollere_check_cves | no tags | |
| tollere_diff_versions | no tags | |
| tollere_detect_sandwich | no tags | |
| tollere_scan_docker | no tags | |
| tollere_scan_extension | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestcea57fd40ea6aad8
Scanned2026-08-25
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Pinned to 0.2.3 — the install command below asks for that release. A pin is part of an install, so it is kept for this visit and written down when you install.
0.2.3
undated
installedNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Reviews are earned
Only accounts with at least 50 real tool calls against this server in the last 90 days can post. Ratings are weighted by how much the reviewer actually uses it, and publishers can reply once per review.
Reviews are earned
Writing one takes an account with at least 50 real tool calls against Tollere in the last 90 days. That is the whole gate — there is no other way to post, which is why the counts beside each review are worth reading.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes an account with 50 real tool calls against it.