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FedTally — US Federal Contract Intelligence is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
US federal contract recompetes with the incumbent named, awards by company, agency spend.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http fedtally-us-federal-contract-intelligence-mcp https://fedtally.com/api/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# search_awards_by_company, get_agency_spend, get_expiring_contracts
FedTally — US Federal Contract Intelligence costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http fedtally-us-federal-contract-intelligence-mcp https://fedtally.com/api/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
3 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Top US federal prime contract awards won by a company, largest award amount first. Use it to size a contractor's federal business, see which agencies buy from it, or pull its biggest named contracts. Matching is full-text on the recipient name, so pass the company's common or legal name ("Booz Allen", "Lockheed Martin") rather than a ticker or internal abbreviation; a name that is too specific ret
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | Company name to match against federal award recipients, e.g. "Booz Allen". |
| page | integer | no | Page of 25 awards, sorted by amount descending. Defaults to 1. |
Where one federal agency's contract dollars went in a fiscal year: its top vendors and its top NAICS industries, both ranked by obligated amount. Use it to answer who sells to an agency and what that agency buys. The agency argument must resolve to a single toptier agency — use the full name ("Department of Veterans Affairs") or the official abbreviation ("VA"); an ambiguous fragment matching seve
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agency | string | yes | Toptier agency name or abbreviation, e.g. "Department of Homeland Security" or "GSA". |
| fiscalYear | integer | no | US federal fiscal year, e.g. 2026. Defaults to the current fiscal year. |
Federal contracts whose period of performance ends inside a chosen window for one NAICS industry — the recompete pipeline, useful for finding work about to be rebid and identifying the incumbent to displace. Rows come back soonest expiry first with the end date, days remaining, contract PIID and parent IDV, incumbent vendor name and UEI, contracting department, obligated dollars, total contract va
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| naics | string | yes | NAICS industry code, 2 to 6 digits, e.g. "541511" for custom computer programming. |
| days | integer | no | Days ahead to look for expiring periods of performance. Defaults to 180. |
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install FedTally — US Federal Contract Intelligence or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_awards_by_company | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_agency_spend | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_expiring_contracts | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.1.0.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish FedTally — US Federal Contract Intelligence can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.