Neural network swarm orchestration with WebAssembly acceleration and MCP integration
Nothing to run from here
ToolFit + MCPCheck is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
tool-list score
6
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
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calls last 7d
What it does
Audit, pin and diff agent tool lists; preflight and watch remote MCP servers. Free tier; x402.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http toolfit-mcpcheck https://api.youraitools.co/toolfit/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# audit_tools, diff_tools, check_mcp_server and 3 more
ToolFit + MCPCheck costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
YOAll 24 servers
youraitools24 servers
7 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http toolfit-mcpcheck https://api.youraitools.co/toolfit/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
6 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Check the tool definitions an agent loads, before they cost tokens or fail: estimated tokens per tool, schema errors per provider (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Bedrock, MCP; add openai_strict for strict mode) with JSON paths and fixed definitions, tool pairs models will confuse with fix hints, basic poisoning patterns, a grade and a pin (set_id) for diff_tools. Pass "tools" (array in any common form
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| tools | array | no | Tool definitions: MCP tools/list entries, OpenAI {type:"function",function:{...}}, Anthropic {name,description,input_schema}, Gemini functionDeclarations or Bedrock toolSpec. Max 500. |
| url | string | no | Public remote MCP server URL (Streamable HTTP, https), e.g. https://api.youraitools.co/mcp/hub. ToolFit only lists its tools. |
| providers | array | no | Providers to check (default openai, anthropic, gemini, bedrock, mcp; add openai_strict for Structured Outputs strict mode). GET: comma list. |
| level | string | no | lite = summary only; full (default) = every issue, fixed definitions, pair hints |
What changed in a tool list since you approved it? Compares "tools" or "url" now with "pin" (set_id from audit_tools/diff_tools) or "baseline" (earlier definitions). Each change is labeled breaking (removed tool or param, new required param, type or enum removal), suspicious (new text with injection patterns or hidden characters), review (description, title, annotation or new tool) or additive; de
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| pin | string | no | A pin (set_id "ts_..." from an earlier ToolFit call) to compare against. |
| baseline | array | no | Instead of pin: the earlier tool definitions themselves. |
| tools | array | no | Tool definitions: MCP tools/list entries, OpenAI {type:"function",function:{...}}, Anthropic {name,description,input_schema}, Gemini functionDeclarations or Bedrock toolSpec. Max 500. |
| url | string | no | Public remote MCP server URL (Streamable HTTP, https), e.g. https://api.youraitools.co/mcp/hub. ToolFit only lists its tools. |
Does this remote MCP server work, and is it worth connecting or paying for? Sends initialize and tools/list only (never calls a tool) and reports reachability, protocol version, sign-in method (OAuth protected-resource metadata), x402 payment terms if it asks for payment, latency, tool count and token cost, provider compatibility, poisoning patterns in tools and server instructions, issues and a g
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | Public remote MCP server URL (Streamable HTTP, https), e.g. https://api.youraitools.co/mcp/hub. ToolFit only lists its tools. |
Hosted watch (paid only; this MCP call validates and returns how to pay): ToolFit re-audits a public remote MCP server every 24 h ($0.25) or 6 h ($0.60) for 30 days and POSTs an HMAC-SHA256 signed JSON webhook to your https endpoint when its tools/list fingerprint or grade changes, or it goes unreachable or recovers. Pay at POST /v1/watch or /v1/watch/6h with x402 or a credits key; the response ha
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | Public remote MCP server URL (Streamable HTTP, https), e.g. https://api.youraitools.co/mcp/hub. ToolFit only lists its tools. |
| webhook | string | yes | Your https endpoint (public host, port 443) that receives the signed JSON change notifications. A query string is allowed. |
| every | string | no | Check interval: 24h (default, $0.25 per 30 days) or 6h ($0.60 per 30 days). |
Free: state (active, expired, cancelled), interval, expiry, next check, last result (pin, grade, score, tool count) and webhook delivery counters for a watch. Needs watch_id and the secret returned when it was created.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch_id | string | yes | watch_id (w_...) returned by POST /v1/watch |
| secret | string | yes | The whsec_... secret returned once when the watch was created |
Free: cancel a watch (no further checks or webhooks; not refunded). Needs watch_id and the secret returned when it was created.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch_id | string | yes | watch_id (w_...) returned by POST /v1/watch |
| secret | string | yes | The whsec_... secret returned once when the watch was created |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install ToolFit + MCPCheck or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100
Release 0.1.1 · scanned 25 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 5 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestd5bfedda91ff5eb85a58dca88892eae8f57f6e26cbf2f2237a7818eb7af541af
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| audit_tools | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| diff_tools | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| check_mcp_server | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| watch_mcp_server | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "webhook", parameter "webhook", declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| watch_status | no tags | |
| watch_cancel | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestd5bfedda91ff5eb8
Scanned2026-10-25
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.1.1.
0.1.1
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish ToolFit + MCPCheck can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.