MCP server for terminal commands, file operations, and process management
Nothing to run from here
Nukez is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
15
tools declared
—
trust score
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Agent-native storage with cryptographic verification on Solana. Keyless: clients sign and pay.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http nukez-mcp https://mcp.nukez.xyz/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# nukez_quote, nukez_pay, nukez_provision and 12 more
Nukez costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
ZLAll 1 server
ZlaylowZ1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http nukez-mcp https://mcp.nukez.xyz/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
15 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Step 1: Get storage pricing and payment options. Returns price breakdown and every available payment method (SOL/USDC/USDT/WETH/BETA on Solana, USDC/USDT0/MON/WETH on Monad). Each option carries a destination_kind: 'wallet' (native SOL — send lamports to pay_to_address), 'spl_token_account' (Solana SPL tokens — pay_to_address IS already the treasury's token account; pass it DIRECTLY as the trans
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| units | integer | no | — |
| provider | string | no | — |
| pay_network | no | — | |
| pay_asset | no | — |
Step 2: Record an externally-executed on-chain payment. The server is keyless and never signs transactions — execute the transfer yourself (Solana sendTransaction or an EVM client) and pass the resulting signature as tx_sig. Uses pay_req_id from nukez_quote (auto-resolved from state). Specify chain and pay_asset to identify the rail (e.g. chain='solana-mainnet', pay_asset='BETA'); defaults to the
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| pay_req_id | no | — | |
| tx_sig | no | — | |
| chain | no | — | |
| pay_asset | no | — |
Step 3: Confirm payment settlement on the gateway and provision the storage locker. Two modes: (a) Without envelope: pass pay_req_id + tx_sig (auto-resolved from state). Returns the receipt_id and a hint to build a signed locker:provision envelope. (b) With receipt_id + envelope: forwards the signed envelope to /v1/storage/signed_provision and activates the locker. Also accepts `receipt_id
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| pay_req_id | no | — | |
| tx_sig | no | — | |
| chain | no | — | |
| pay_asset | no | — | |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Set up Nukez storage: checks wallet, purchases storage, and provisions locker in a single call. Call with no args to run the full flow. Call with receipt_id to rehydrate an existing locker. Providers: gcs (default), mongodb, storj, arweave, filecoin, firestore. Payments: Solana (SOL, USDC, USDT, WETH, BETA) and Monad/EVM (MON, USDC, USDT0, WETH) — chain is auto-detected.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| units | integer | no | — |
| provider | string | no | — |
| envelope | no | — |
Create a file entry and get upload_url + confirm_url for direct upload. The client PUTs raw bytes directly to the upload_url (307-redirects to GCS), then calls nukez_confirm to finalize. Bytes never transit the MCP server. Use this for large files from local/external sources against Cloud Run. For small inline content (<4KB), use nukez_store with data_b64 instead. KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: this ser
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| filename | string | yes | — |
| content_type | no | — | |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Store files in your Nukez locker. ALWAYS BATCH: pass ALL the files you want to upload in a SINGLE call, as a list under files. Do NOT loop over your file list and call nukez_store once per file — that triggers one on-chain attestation per file (slow + costs SOL fees per push). One nukez_store call with N files triggers exactly ONE attestation for the whole batch. Each list item: {name, <data_sou
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| files | array | yes | — |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Confirm a file upload after sandbox curl completes. Call this after executing the curl command returned by nukez_store in sandbox mode. The server computes SHA-256 and records the hash. Requires a payer-signed locker:write envelope: signer-mode deployments sign automatically via the SDK; keyless clients first call without envelope to receive the exact envelope spec to sign, then re-call with envel
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| filename | no | — | |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — | |
| use_job | boolean | no | — |
| job_id | no | — |
Upload a file in chunks when sandbox curl/network is blocked. PREPARATION — run this bash script first to split and hash: python3 -c " import base64, hashlib, os, json, math path = '<SANDBOX_FILE_PATH>' CHUNK = 4096 size = os.path.getsize(path) n = math.ceil(size / CHUNK) os.makedirs('/tmp/nkz', exist_ok=True) hashes = [] with open(path, 'rb') as f: for i in range(n): raw = f.read(CH
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| filename | string | yes | — |
| data_b64 | string | yes | — |
| part_no | integer | yes | — |
| is_last | boolean | no | — |
| content_type | no | — | |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| sha256 | no | — | |
| job_id | no | — | |
| file_id | no | — |
List files or download content from your Nukez locker. Call with no filenames to list all files. Call with filenames=['file.txt'] to download specific files. KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: a call without envelope returns action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact list spec to sign (locker:list, plus locker:read when downloading); sign it with your wallet and re-call with the same arguments plus e
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| filenames | no | — | |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| encoding | string | no | — |
| envelope | no | — |
Fast structural verification of locker state. Returns merkle root, attestation status, and optional per-file proof. Pass memory_key to verify a specific memory record by key. Cheap: reads the persisted attestation; latency is independent of locker size (~sub-second typical). With push=True, also triggers a fresh on-chain attestation: the gateway enqueues the same background job the async path uses
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| push | boolean | no | — |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| filename | no | — | |
| memory_key | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Byte-level integrity proof: re-downloads every file from storage, recomputes content hashes, rebuilds the merkle tree, and compares the result against the persisted attestation. Returns match=True when storage bytes still match the recorded hashes, match=False when they have drifted. Cost: scales with total locker bytes (re-downloads everything). Slower than nukez_verify — reach for this only on a
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Check wallet balance, locker state, and lifecycle stage. Works at any stage — no active locker required.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Delete files from your Nukez locker. WARNING: permanent and irreversible. Invalidates existing attestation. KEYLESS (hosted) SERVER: a call without envelope returns action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact delete spec to sign (locker:write, bound to one file's path); sign it with your wallet and re-call with filenames=[that file] plus envelope=<signed result>. One file per call in envelop
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| filenames | array | yes | — |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Store a structured memory record in your Nukez locker. Memories are indexed for fast search via nukez_recall. Use namespaces to organize (e.g., 'config', 'context', 'decisions'). Requires: key, content, summary. ENVELOPE: pass a list of 2 envelopes (each with unique nonce, POST path, ops=locker:write) — one for the record file, one for the index.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | yes | — |
| content | string | yes | — |
| summary | string | yes | — |
| namespace | string | no | — |
| tags | string | no | — |
| supersedes | string | no | — |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Search and retrieve memory records from your Nukez locker. Two modes: exact key lookup (pass key) returns full content + proof, or search (pass namespace/tags/query/prefix) returns matching index entries. ENVELOPE: none needed — both index and record are read via the public receipt-proxy URL. Just pass receipt_id.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | no | — |
| namespace | string | no | — |
| tags | string | no | — |
| query | string | no | — |
| prefix | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| receipt_id | no | — | |
| envelope | no | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Nukez or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
—Grade not published
No rule-by-rule report on file for this release
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
This listing is an address its publisher runs, and you connect to it directly — this marketplace is not in the path. The scanner reads packages and public source, and an address is neither. So there is no grade — not a withheld one, an unmeasured one.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.3.0.
1.3.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Nukez can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.